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CLUSTER VIII: CULTURAL AND  
POSTCOLONIAL CRITIQUES IN LATCRIT  
THEORY: Nuestra America: Reinventing a Subaltern  
Paradigm of Recognition and Redistribution

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**BIO:**

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**SUMMARY:** ... Americanization, as a hegemonic form of globalization, is thus the third act of the millennial drama of Western supremacy. ... Extremism of forms alone allows baroque subjectivity to entertain the turbulence and excitement necessary to continue the struggle for emancipatory causes, in a world in which emancipation has been collapsed into or absorbed by hegemonic regulation. ... Such political culture will concentrate on (1) identifying the multiple local/global linkages among struggles, movements, and initiatives; (2) promoting the clashes between hegemonic globalization trends and pressures, on one side, and the transnational coalitions to resist against them, on the other, thus opening up possibilities for counter-hegemonic globalizations; and (3) promoting internal and external self-reflexivity so that the forms of redistribution and recognition that are established among the movements mirror the forms of redistribution and recognition that transnational emancipatory sub-politics wishes to see implemented in the world. ... Discussions about counter-hegemonic globalization tends to focus on social, political, and cultural initiatives, only rarely focusing on the economic ones, that is, on local/global initiatives consisting of non-capitalist production and distribution of goods and services, whether in rural or urban settings: cooperatives, mutualities, credit systems, farming of invaded land by landless peasants, sustainable water systems and fishing communities, ecological logging, etc. ...

[\*1049]

#### I. The European American Century

According to Hegel, we recall, universal history goes from the East to the West. Asia is the beginning, while

Europe is the ultimate end of universal history, the place where the civilizational trajectory of humankind is fulfilled. The biblical and medieval idea of the succession of empires (*translatio imperii*) becomes in Hegel the triumphal way of the Universal Idea. In each era a people takes on the responsibility of conducting the Universal Idea, thereby becoming the historical universal people, a privilege which has in turn passed from the Asian to the Greek, then to the Roman, and, finally, to the German peoples. America, or rather, North America, carries, for Hegel, an ambiguous future, in that it does not collide with the utmost fulfilling of the universal history in Europe. The future of (North) America is still a European future, made up of Europe's left-over population.

This Hegelian idea underlies the dominant conception of the twentieth century as the American century: the European American Century. Herein implied is the notion that the americanization of the world, starting with the americanization of Europe itself, is but an effect of the European universal cunning of reason, which, having reached the Far West and unreconciled with the exile to which Hegel had condemned it, was forced to turn back, walk back upon its own track and once again trace the path of its hegemony over the East. Americanization, as a hegemonic form of globalization, is thus the third act of the millennial drama of Western supremacy. The first act, to a large extent a failed act, was the Crusades, which started the second millennium of the Christian era; the second act, beginning halfway through the millennium, was the discoveries and subsequent European expansion. In this millennial conception, the European [\*1050] American century carries little novelty; it is nothing more than one more European century, the last one of the millennium. Europe, after all, has always contained many Europes, some of them dominant, others dominated. The United States of America is the last dominant Europe; like the previous ones, it exerts its uncontested power over the dominated Europes. The feudal lords of eleventh-century Europe had and desired as little autonomy vis-a-vis Pope Urban II, who recruited them for the Crusades, as the European Union countries today vis-a-vis the US of President Clinton, who recruits them to the Balkan wars. n1 From one episode to the other, only the dominant conception of the dominant West has been restricted. The more restrictive the conception of the West, the closer the East. Jerusalem is now Kosovo.

In these conditions it is hard to think of any alternative to the current regime of international relations which has become a core element of what I call hegemonic globalization. However, such an alternative is not only necessary but urgent, since the current regime, as it loses coherence, becomes more violent and unpredictable, thus enhancing the vulnerability of subordinate social groups, regions, and nations. The real danger, regarding both intranational and international relations, is the emergence of what I call societal fascism. Fleeing from Germany a few months before his death, Walter Benjamin wrote his Thesis on the Theory of History which was prompted by the idea that European society lived at the time during a moment of danger. n2 I think that today we live in a moment of danger as well. In Benjamin's time, the danger was the rise of fascism as a political regime. In our time, the danger is the rise of fascism as a societal regime. Unlike political fascism, societal fascism is pluralistic, coexists easily with the democratic state, and its privileged time-space, rather than being national, is both local and global.

Societal fascism is a set of social processes by which large bodies of populations are irreversibly kept outside or thrown out of any kind of social contract. n3 They are rejected, excluded, and thrown into a kind of Hobbesian state of nature, either because they have never been part of any social contract and probably never will (the pre-contractual underclasses everywhere in the world, the best example of which are probably the youth of urban ghettos) or because they [\*1051] have been excluded, or thrown out of whatever social contract they had been part of before (the post-contractual underclasses, millions of workers of post-fordism, peasants after the collapse of land-reform projects or other development projects).

As a societal regime, fascism manifests itself as the collapse of the most trivial expectations of the people living under it. What we call a society is a bundle of stabilized expectations from the subway schedule, to the salary at the end of the month, or employment at the end of a college education. Expectations are stabilized by a set of shared scales and equivalences: a given pay for a given work, a given punishment for a given crime, a given insurance for a given risk. The people that live under societal fascism are deprived of shared scales and equivalences and, therefore, of stabilized expectations. They live in a constant chaos of expectations in which the most trivial acts may be met with the most dramatic consequences. They run many risks and none of them is insured. Gualdino Jesus, a Pataxo Indian from Northeast Brazil, symbolizes the nature of such risks. He had come to Brazilia to take part in the march of the landless. The night was warm and he decided to sleep on a bench at

the bus stop. At the early morning hours he was killed by three middle-class youths: one was the son of a judge, and another was a son of an army officer. As the youngsters confessed later on to the police, they killed "the Indian" for the fun of it. They "didn't even know he was an Indian, they thought he was a homeless vagrant." This event is mentioned here as a parable of what I call societal fascism.

One possible future is therefore the spread of societal fascism. There are many signs that this is a real possibility. If the logic of the market is allowed to spill over from the economy to all fields of social life and to become the sole criterion for a successful social and political interaction, society will become ungovernable and ethically repugnant. Whatever order is achieved will be of a fascistic kind, as indeed predicted decades ago. n4

It is important, however, to bear in mind that, as my example shows, it is not the state that may become fascistic, but rather that social relations - both local, national and international relations - may become so. The disjuncture in social relations between inclusion and exclusion has already gone so deep that it becomes increasingly a spatial disjuncture: including people that live in civilized areas, and excluding people in savage areas. Fences are raised between the two area types (i.e. closed condominiums, gated communities). In the savage zones, because they are potentially ungovernable, the [\*1052] democratic state is democratically legitimated to act fascistically. This process is more likely to occur the more the dominant consensus about the weak state is left unchecked. It is today becoming clear that only a strong democratic state can effectively produce its own weakness, and that only a strong democratic state can promote the emergence of a strong civil society. Otherwise, in contrast to a weak state, once the structural adjustment is accomplished, we will be confronted with strong mafias, as this phenomenon is seen in today's Russia.

In this article, I argue that the alternative to the spread of societal fascism is the construction of a new pattern of local, national, and transnational relations, based both on the principle of redistribution (equality) and the principle of recognition (difference). In a globalized world, such relations must emerge as counter-hegemonic globalizations. The pattern sustaining them must be much more than a set of institutions. Such pattern entails a new transnational political culture embedded in new forms of sociability and subjectivity. Ultimately, it implies a new revolutionary "natural law," as revolutionary as the seventeenth-century conceptions of "natural law" were. For reasons that will soon become clear, I will call this new "natural" law" a baroque cosmopolitan law.

As I argue, at the margins of the European American Century another century emerged, which was a truly new and American century. I call it the Nuestra America American Century. While the former carries the hegemonic globalization, the latter contains in itself the potential for counter-hegemonic globalizations. Since this potential lies in the future, the Nuestra America American Century may well be the name of the century we are now entering. In the first section of my article, I explain what I mean by globalization, and particularly counter-hegemonic globalization. Then I specify in some detail the most outstanding features of the idea of Nuestra America as it conceived of itself in the mirror of the European American Century. In the following section, I analyze the baroque ethos, conceived of as the cultural archetype of Nuestra America subjectivity and sociability. My analysis highlights some of the emancipatory potential of a new baroque "natural law," conceived of as cosmopolitan law, a law based neither on God nor on abstract nature, but rather on the social and political culture of social groups whose everyday life is energized by the need to transform survival strategies into sources of innovation, creativity, transgression, and subversion. In the last sections of the article, I will try to show how this emancipatory counter-hegemonic potential of Nuestra America has so far not been realized and how it may be realized in the 21st century. Finally, I identify five areas, all of them deeply embedded in the secular experience of Nuestra America, which in my view will be **[\*1053]** the main contested terrains of the struggle between hegemonic and counter-hegemonic globalizations, and thus the playing field for a new transnational political culture and the baroque "natural law" that legitimizes it. In each one of these contested terrains, the emancipatory potential of the struggles is premised upon the idea that the politics of redistribution cannot be successfully conducted without the politics of recognition, and vice-versa.

## II. On Counter-hegemonic Globalizations

Before I proceed, let me clarify what I mean by hegemonic and counter-hegemonic globalization. Most authors conceive of one form of globalization only, rejecting the distinction between hegemonic and counter-hegemonic globalization. <sup>n5</sup> Once globalization is conceived of as being one alone, resistance to it on the part of its victims - granted that it may be possible to resist it at all - can only take the form of localization. Jerry Mander, for example, speaks of "ideas about the viability of smaller-scale, localized, diversified economies, hooked into but not dominated by outside forces." <sup>n6</sup> Similarly, Richard Douthwaite affirms that

Since a local unsustainability cannot cancel local sustainability elsewhere, a sustainable world would consist of a number of territories, each of which would be sustainable independently of the others. In other words, rather than a single global economy which would damage everyone if it crashed, a sustainable world would contain a plethora of regional (sub-national) economies producing all the essentials of life from the resources of their territories and therefore largely independent of each other. <sup>n7</sup>

**[\*1054]** According to this view, the shift toward the local is mandatory. It is the only way of guaranteeing sustainability.

I start from the assumption that what we usually call globalization consists of sets of social relations; as these sets of social relations change, so does globalization. There is no single entity called globalization. Accordingly, we should use globalization only in the plural. On the other hand, if globalizations are bundles of social relations, the latter are bound to involve conflicts, hence, both winners and losers. More often than not, the discourse on globalization is the story of the winners as told by the winners. Actually, the victory is apparently so absolute that the defeated end up vanishing from the picture altogether.

Here is my definition of globalization: it is the process by which a given local condition or entity succeeds in extending its reach over the globe and, by so doing, develops the capacity to designate a rival social condition or entity as local.

The most important implications of this definition are the following. First, there is no genuine globalization in the conditions of the western capitalist world system. What we call globalization is always the successful globalization of a given localism. In other words, there is no global condition for which we cannot find a local root, a specific cultural embeddedness. The second implication is that globalization entails localization; that is, localization is the globalization of the losers. In fact, we live in a world of localization, as much as we live in a world of globalization. Therefore, it would be equally correct in analytical terms if we were to define the current situation and our research topics in terms of localization, rather than globalization. We prefer the latter term because hegemonic scientific discourse tends to prefer the story of the world as told by the winners. In order to account for the asymmetrical power relations within what we call globalization, I have suggested elsewhere that we distinguish four modes of production of globalization: globalized

localisms, localized globalisms, cosmopolitanism, and common heritage of humankind. n8 According to this conception, the first two modes comprise what we call hegemonic globalization. Globalized localisms and localized globalisms are driven by the forces of global capitalism, either through exclusion or through inclusion. The excluded, whether people or countries, or even continents like Africa, are integrated in the global economy by the specific ways in which they are excluded from it. This explains why among the millions of [\*1055] people that live on the streets, in urban ghettos, reservations, the killing fields of Uraba or Burundi, the Andean Mountains or the Amazonic frontier, in refugee camps, occupied territories, sweatshops that use millions of bonded child laborers, there is much more in common than we are ready to admit.

The two other forms of globalization - cosmopolitanism and common heritage of humankind - are what I call counter-hegemonic globalizations. All over the world the hegemonic processes of exclusion are being met with different forms of resistance - grassroots initiatives, local organizations, popular movements, transnational advocacy networks, new forms of labor internationalism - that try to counteract social exclusion. These resistance movements open up spaces for democratic participation, community building, and alternatives to dominant forms of development and knowledge, in sum, for social inclusion. These local-global linkages and cross-border activism constitute a new transnational democratic movement. After the demonstrations in Seattle against the World Trade Organization in November, 1999, those in Prague against the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in September, 2000, and the two meetings of the World Social Forum in Porto Alegre, Brazil (2001, 2002), this movement is becoming a new component of international politics and, more generally, part of a new progressive political culture. The new local-global advocacy networks focus on a wide variety of issues: human rights, environment, ethnic and sexual discrimination, biodiversity, labor standards, alternative protection systems, indigenous rights, etc. n9

This new "activism beyond borders" constitutes an emergent paradigm which, following Ulrich Beck, we could call a transnational, emancipatory sub-politics, the political Geist of counter-hegemonic globalizations. The credibility of the transnational sub-politics is still to be established, and its sustainability is an open question. If we measure its influence and success in light of the following four levels - issue creation and agenda setting; changes in the rhetoric of the decision-makers; institutional changes; effective impact on concrete policies - there is enough evidence

to say that it has been successful [\*1056] in confronting hegemonic globalization at the two first levels of influence. It remains to be seen how successful it will be, and within what span of time, at the two last and more demanding levels of influence.

For the purposes of my argument in this article, two characteristics of transnational sub-politics must be highlighted at this point. The first one, a positive one, is that, contrary to the Western modern paradigms of progressive social transformation (revolution, socialism, social-democracy), the transnational sub-politics are as much involved in a politics of equality (redistribution) as in a politics of difference (recognition). This does not mean that these two kinds of politics are equally present in the different kinds of struggles, campaigns, and movements. Some struggles may privilege the politics of equality (campaigns against sweatshops or of new movements of labor internationalism). Other struggles, on the contrary, may privilege the politics of difference (some campaigns against racism and xenophobia in Europe or of some indigenous, aboriginal, and tribal rights movements in Latin-America, Australia, New Zealand, and India). Still other struggles may explicitly combine politics of equality with politics of difference. Such is the case of some other campaigns against racism and xenophobia in Europe, women's movements throughout the world, campaigns against the plundering of biodiversity (or biopiracy) most of it located in indigenous territories. The articulation between redistribution and recognition becomes far more visible once we look at these movements, initiatives, and campaigns as a new constellation of political and cultural emancipatory meanings in an unevenly globalized world. So far, such meanings have not yet conquered their self-reflexivity. One of the purposes of this article is to point to one possible path toward this end.

The other characteristic of transnational sub-politics, a negative one, is that, so far, theories of separation have prevailed over theories of union among the great variety of existing movements, campaigns, and initiatives. Indeed, truly global activity is only the logic of hegemonic globalization, poised to keep them separate and mutually unintelligible. For this reason, the notion of a counter-hegemonic globalization has a strong utopian component, and its full meaning can only be grasped through indirect procedures. I distinguish three main procedures: the sociology of absences, the theory of translation and the Manifesto practices.

The sociology of absences is the procedure through which what does not exist, or whose existence is socially ungraspable or inexpressible, is conceived of

as the active result of a given social process. The sociology of absences invents or unveils whatever social and political conditions, experiments, initiatives, and conceptions [\*1057] have been successfully suppressed by hegemonic forms of globalization; or, rather than suppressed, have not been allowed to exist or to become pronounceable as a need or an aspiration. In the specific case of counter-hegemonic globalization, the sociology of absences is the procedure through which the incompleteness of particular anti-hegemonic struggles, as well as the inadequacy of local resistance in a globalized world, are constructed. Such incompleteness and inadequacy derive from the absent (suppressed, unimagined, and discredited) links that might connect such struggles with other struggles elsewhere in the world that would strengthen their potential to build credible counter-hegemonic alternatives. The more expertly the sociology of absences is performed, the greater the perception of incompleteness and inadequacy. At any rate, the universal and global movements constructed by the sociology of absences, do not deny or eliminate the particular and the local, but actually encourage them to envision what is beyond them as a condition of their successful resistance and possible alternatives.

Central to the sociology of absences is the notion that social experience is made up of social inexperience. This concept is taboo for the dominant classes that promote hegemonic capitalist globalization and its legitimizing cultural paradigm: Eurocentric modernity or what Scott Lash also calls "high modernity," n10 or what I call "celebratory postmodernity." n11 The dominant classes have always taken as a given their particular experience of having to suffer the consequences of the ignorance, baseness, or dangerousness of the dominated classes. Absent from their minds has always been their own inexperience of the suffering, death, pillage imposed as experience upon the oppressed classes, groups or peoples. n12 For the latter, however, it is crucial to incorporate in their experience the inexperience of the oppressors concerning the suffering, humiliation and exploitation imposed upon the oppressed. The practice of sociology of absences is what endows counter-hegemonic struggles with cosmopolitanism; that is, openness towards the other and increased knowledge. This is the kind of knowledge Roberto Retamar has in mind when he asserts: "There is only one type of person who really knows in its entirety the literature of Europe: the colonial." n13

[\*1058] To bring about such openness, it is necessary to resort to a second procedure: the theory of translation. A given particular or local struggle (for instance, an indigenous or feminist struggle) only recognizes another (for instance, an environment or

labor struggle) to the extent that both lose some of their particularism and localism. This occurs as mutual intelligibility between struggles is created. Mutual intelligibility is a prerequisite of what I would call the internal, self-reflexive mix of politics of equality and politics of difference among movements, initiatives, campaigns, networks. It is the lack of internal self-reflexivity that has allowed theories of separation to prevail over theories of union. Some movements, initiatives, and campaigns rally around the principle of equality, others around the principle of difference. The theory of translation is the procedure that allows for mutual intelligibility. Unlike a general theory of transformative action, the theory of translation keeps intact the autonomy of the struggles in question as condition for the translation, since only what is different can be translated. To render mutually intelligible means to identify what unites and is common to entities that are separate by their reciprocal differences. The theory of translation permits to identify the common ground in an indigenous struggle, a feminist struggle, an ecological struggle, etc., without canceling out in any of them the autonomy and difference that sustains them.

Once it is identified, what unites and is common to different anti-hegemonic struggles becomes a principle of action only to the extent that it is identified as the solution for the incompleteness and inadequacy of the struggles that remain confined to their particularism and localism. This step occurs by means of the Manifesto practices: clear and unequivocal blueprints of alliances and mobilization. The former are possible because they are based on common denominators, and the latter are possible given the positive result in mobilizing. That is to say, the Manifesto practices grant specific advantages to all those participating in them according to their degree of participation.

Thus conceived, transnational emancipatory sub-politics or counter-hegemonic globalization has demanding conditions. What one expects from it is a tense and dynamic equilibrium between difference and equality, between identity and solidarity, between autonomy and cooperation, and between recognition and redistribution. The success of the abovementioned procedures depends, therefore, on cultural, political, and economic factors. In the 1980s, the "cultural turn" contributed decisively to highlight the poles of difference, identity, autonomy, and recognition, but it often [\*1059] did it in a culturalist way, that is to say, by playing down the economic and political factors. Thus were the poles of equality, solidarity, cooperation, and redistribution neglected. At the beginning of the new century, after almost twenty years of fierce neoliberal globalization, the balance between the two poles must be retrieved. From the

perspective of an oppositional postmodernity, the idea that there is no recognition without redistribution is central. n14 Perhaps the best way to formulate this idea today is to resort to a modernist device, the notion of a fundamental meta-right: the right to have rights. We have the right to be equal whenever difference diminishes us; we have the right to be different whenever equality decharacterizes us. We have here a normative hybrid: it is modernist because it is based on an abstract universalism, but it is formulated in such a way as to sanction a postmodern opposition based both on redistribution and recognition.

Again, the new constellations of meaning at work in transnational emancipatory sub-politics have not yet reached their self-reflexive moment. That this moment must occur, however, is crucial to the reinvention of political culture in the new century and millennium. The only way to encourage its emergence is by excavating the ruins of the marginalized, suppressed, or silenced traditions upon which Eurocentric modernity built its own supremacy. They are "another modernity." n15

To my mind, the Nuestra-America American Century has best formulated the idea of social emancipation based on the meta-right to have rights and on the dynamic equilibrium between recognition and redistribution presupposed by it. It has also most dramatically shown the difficulty of constructing successful emancipatory practices on that basis.

#### A. The Nuestra America American Century

Nuestra America is the title of a short essay by Jose Marti, published in the Mexican paper "El Partido Liberal" on January 30, 1891. n16 In this article, which is an excellent summary of Martian thinking to be found in several Latin American papers at the time, Marti expresses the set of ideas which I believe were to preside over the Nuestra-America American Century, a set of ideas later pursued, among many others including Jose Carlos Mariategui, Oswald de Andrade, Fernando Ortiz, and Darcy Ribeiro.

The main ideas in this agenda are as follows. First, Nuestra America is at the antipodes of European America. It is the America [\*1060] mestiza founded at the often violent crossing of much European, Indian, and African blood. It is the America that is capable of delving deeply into its own roots and thereupon to edify a knowledge and a government that are not imported, but rather adequate to its reality. Its deepest roots are the struggle of the Amerindian peoples against their invaders, where we find the true precursors "of the Latin-American independentistas." n17 Asks Marti: "Is it not evident that America itself

was paralyzed by the same blow that paralyzed the Indian?" And he answers: "Until the Indian is caused to walk, America itself will not begin to walk well." n18 Although in Nuestra America Marti deals mainly with anti-Indian racism, elsewhere he refers also to the black people: "A human being is more than white, more than mulatto, more than black. Cuban is more than white, more than mulatto, more than black ... Two kinds of racist would be equally guilty: the white racist and the black racist." n19

The second idea about Nuestra America is that its mixed roots gave rise to infinite complexity, a new form of universalism that made the world richer. Says Marti: "There is no race hatred because there are no races." n20 In this sentence, there reverberates the same radical liberalism that had encouraged Simon Bolivar to proclaim that Latin America was a small humankind. This kind of situated and contextualized universalism was to become one of the most enduring leitmotifs of Nuestra America.

In 1928, the Brazilian poet Oswald de Andrade published his Anthropophagous Manifesto. By anthropophagy he understood the American's capacity to devour all that was alien to him and to incorporate all so as to create a complex identity, a new, constantly changing identity:

Only what is not mine interests me. The law of men. The law of the anthropophagous ... Against all importers of canned consciousness. The palpable existence of life. Pre-logical mentality for Mr. Levy-Bruhl to study ... I asked a man what is law. He said it is the guarantee of the exercise of possibility. This man's name was Galli Mathias. I swallowed him. Anthropophagy. Absorption of the sacred enemy. To turn him to totem. The human adventure. Earthly finality. However, only the pure elites managed to accomplish carnal anthropophagy, the one which carries with itself the highest meaning of life and avoids the evils identified by Freud, the [\*1061] catechetical evils. n21

This concept of anthropophagy, ironic in itself in relation to the European representation of the "Carib instinct," is quite close to the concept of transculturation developed by Fernando Ortiz in Cuba somewhat later (1940). n22 For a more recent example, I quote the Brazilian anthropologist Darcy Ribeiro in a burst of brilliant humor:

It is quite easy to make an Australia: take a few French, English, Irish, and Italian people, throw them in a deserted island, they kill the Indians and make a second-rate England, damm it, or third-rate, that shit.

Brazil has to realize that that is shit, Canada is shit, because it just repeats Europe. Just to show that ours is the adventure of making the new humankind, mestizaje in flesh and spirit. Mestizo is what is good. n23

The third founding idea of Nuestra America is that for Nuestra America to be built upon its most genuine foundations, it has to endow itself with genuine knowledge. As Marti wrote: "The trenches of ideas are worth more than the trenches of stone." n24 But, to accomplish this, ideas must be rooted in the aspirations of the oppressed peoples. Just as "the authentic mestizo has conquered the exotic Creole, ... the imported book has been conquered in America by the natural man." n25 Hence Marti's appeal:

The European university must yield to the American university. The history of America, from the Incas to the present, must be taught letter perfect, even if that of the Argonauts of Greece is not taught. Our own Greece is preferable to that Greece that is not ours. We have greater need of it. National politicians must replace foreign and exotic politicians. Graft the world into our republics, but the trunk must be that of our republics. And let the conquered pedant be silent: there is no homeland of which the individual can be more proud than our unhappy American republics. n26

This situated knowledge, which demands a continuous attention to identity, behavior, and involvement in public life, is truly what distinguishes a country, not the imperial attribution of levels of civilization. Marti distinguishes the intellectual from the man whom [\*1062] life's experience has made wise. He says, "There is no fight between civilization and barbarism, rather between false erudition and nature." n27

Nuestra America thus carries a strong epistemological component. Rather than importing foreign ideas, one must find out about the specific realities of the continent from a Latin American perspective. Ignoring or disdaining them has helped tyrants to accede to power, and has grounded the arrogance of the United States vis-a-vis the rest of the Continent. "The contempt of the formidable neighbor who does not know her is the major threat to Nuestra America; and he must know her urgently to stop disdaining her. Being ignorant, he might perhaps covet her. Once he knew her, he would, out of respect, take his hand off her." n28

A situated knowledge is, therefore, condition for a situated government. As Marti says elsewhere, one cannot

Rule new peoples with a singular and violent composition, with laws inherited from four centuries of free practice in the United States, and nineteen centuries of monarchy in France. One does not stop the blow in the chest of the plainsman's horse with one of Hamilton's decrees. One does not clear the congealed blood of the Indian race with a sentence of Sieyes. n29

And Marti adds further: "In the republic of Indians, governors learn Indian." n30

The fourth founding idea of Nuestra America is that it is Caliban's America, not Prospero's. Prospero's America lies to the North, but it abides also in the South with those intellectual and political elites who reject the Indian and black roots and look upon Europe and the United States as models to be imitated and upon their own countries with the ethnocentric blinders that distinguish civilization and barbaric wilderness. n31 It is against this world of Prospero that Andrade pushes with his "Carib instinct":

However, not the Crusaders came, rather the runaways from a civilization we are now eating up, for we are, strong and vengeful like the Jabuti... . We did not have speculation. But we did have divination. We had politics, which is the science of distribution. It is a social-planetary system... Before the Portuguese discovered Brazil, Brazil had discovered [\*1063] happiness." n32

The fifth basic idea of Nuestra America is that its political thinking, far from being nationalistic, is rather internationalistic, and is strengthened by an anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist stance, aimed at Europe in the past and now at the United States. Those who think that neoliberal globalization from NAFTA to the Initiative for the Americas and the World Trade Organization is something new should read Marti's reports on the Pan-American Congress of 1889-90 and the American International Monetary Commission of 1891. Here are Marti's remarks on the Pan-American Congress:

Never in America, since independence, was there subject matter demanding more wisdom, requiring more vigilance or calling for clearer and closer attention than the invitation that the powerful United States, filled with unsalable products and determined to expand domination over America, address to the American nations with less power, linked by free, Europe-friendly trade, to form an alliance against Europe and cut off their contacts with the rest of the world. America managed to get rid of Spain's tyranny; now, having looked with judicious eyes upon the

antecedents causes and factors of such an invitation, it is imperative to state, because it is true, that the time has come for Spanish America to declare her second independence. n33

According to Marti, the dominant conceptions in the United States concerning Latin America must incite the latter to distrust all proposals coming from the North. Outraged, Marti accuses:

They believe in necessity, the barbaric right, as the only right, that "this will be ours because we need it.' They believe in incomparable superiority of the "Anglo-Saxon race as opposed to the Latin race'. They believe in the baseness of the negro race which they enslaved in the past and now-a-days humiliate, and of the indian race, which they exterminate. They believe that the peoples of Spanish America are mainly constituted of indians and negros. n34

The fact that Nuestra America and European America are geographically so close, as well as the former's awareness of the dangers issuing from the power imbalance between both, soon forced Nuestra America to claim her autonomy in the form of a thought and a practice from the South: "The North must be left behind." n35 Marti's insight derives from his many years of exile in New York, during [\*1064] which he became well acquainted with "the monster's entrails":

In the North there is no support nor root. In the North the problems increase and there is no charity and patriotism to solve them. Here, men don't learn how to love one another, nor do they love the soil where they are born by chance. Here was set up a machine that more deprives than it can gratify the universe craving for products. Here are piled up the rich on one side and the desperate on the other. The North clams up and is full of hatred. The North must be left behind. n36

It would be difficult to find a more clairvoyant preview of the European American Century and the need to create an alternative to it.

According to Marti, such an alternative resides in a united Nuestra America and the assertion of her autonomy vis-a-vis the United States. In a text dated 1894, Marti writes: "Little is known about our sociology and about such precise laws as the following one: the farther away they keep from the USA, the freer and more prosperous will the peoples of America be." n37 More ambitious and utopic is Oswald de Andrade's alternative: "We want the Caribbean Revolution greater than the French Revolution. One unification of all efficacious revolts on behalf of man.

Without us, Europe would not even have its poor declaration of the rights of man." n38

In sum, for Marti the claim of equality grounds the struggle against unequal difference as much as the claim of difference grounds the struggle against the unequal equality. The only legitimate cannibalization of difference (Andrade's anthropophagy) is the one of the subaltern, because only through it can Caliban recognize his own difference vis-a-vis the unequal differences imposed upon him. In other words, Andrade's anthropophagous digests according to his own guts.

#### B. The Baroque Ethos: Prolegomena for a New Cosmopolitan Law

Nuestra America is no mere intellectual construct for discussion in the salons that gave so much life to Latin American culture in the first decades of the twentieth century. It is a political project, or rather, a set of political projects and a commitment to the objectives contained therein. That was the commitment that dragged Marti to exile and later to death fighting for Cuba's independence. As Oswald de Andrade was to say epigrammatically: "Against the vegetal elites. [\*1065] In contact with the soil." n39 But before it becomes a political project, Nuestra America is a form of subjectivity and sociability. It is a way of being and living permanently in transit and transitoriness, crossing borders, creating borderland spaces, used to risk - with which it has lived for many years, long before the invention of the "risk society," n40 used to enduring a very low level of stability of expectations in the name of a visceral optimism before collective potentiality. Such optimism led Marti to assert in a period of fin de siecle Vienna cultural pessimism: "A governor in a new nation means a creator." n41 The same kind of optimism made Andrade exclaim: "Joy is counter proof." n42

The subjectivity and sociability of Nuestra America are uncomfortable with institutionalized, legalistic thought, but comfortable with utopian thinking. "By utopia I mean the exploration by imagination of new modes of human possibility and styles of will, and the confrontation by imagination of the necessity of whatever exists - just because it exists - on behalf of something radically better that is worth fighting for, and to which humanity is fully entitled." n43 This style of subjectivity and sociability is what I call, following Echeverria, the baroque ethos. n44

Whether as an artistic style or as an historical epoch, the baroque is most specifically a Latin and Mediterranean phenomenon, an eccentric form of modernity, the South of the North, so to speak. Its



eccentricity derives, to a large extent, from the fact that it occurred in countries and historical moments in which the center of power was weak and tried to hide its weakness by dramatizing conformist sociability. The relative lack of central power endows the baroque with an open-ended and unfinished character that allows for the autonomy and creativity of the margins and peripheries. Because of its eccentricity and exaggeration, the center reproduces itself as if it were a margin. This is a centrifugal imagination which becomes stronger as we go from the internal peripheries of the European power to its external peripheries in Latin America. The whole of Latin America was colonized by weak centers, Portugal and Spain. [\*1066] Portugal was a hegemonic center during a brief period of time, between the fifteenth and the sixteenth centuries, and Spain started to decline but a century later. From the seventeenth century onwards, the colonies were more or less left alone, a marginalization that made possible a specific cultural and social creativity, now highly codified, now chaotic, now erudite, now vernacular, now official, now illegal. Such *mestizaje* is so deeply rooted in the social practices of these countries that it came to be considered as grounding a cultural ethos that is typically Latin-American and has prevailed since the seventeenth century until today. This form of baroque, inasmuch as it is the manifestation of an extreme instance of the center's weakness, constitutes a privileged field for the development of a centrifugal, subversive, and blasphemous imagination.

As an epoch in European history, the baroque is a time of crisis and transition. The economic, social and political crisis is particularly obvious in the case of the powers that fostered the first phase of European expansion. In Portugal's case, the crisis implies even loss of independence. By issues of monarchic succession, Portugal was annexed to Spain in 1580, and only regained its independence in 1640. The Spanish monarchy, particularly under Filipe IV (1621-1665), underwent a serious financial crisis that was actually also a political and cultural crisis. As Maravall has pointed out, it begins as a certain awareness of uneasiness and restlessness, which "gets worse as the social fabric is seriously affected." n45 For instance, values and behaviors are questioned, the structure of classes undergoes some changes, banditism and deviant behavior in general increase, revolt and sedition are constant threats. It is indeed a time of crisis, but a time also of transition towards new modes of sociability made possible by the emergent capitalism and the new scientific paradigm, as well as towards new modes of political domination based not only on coercion, but also on cultural and ideological integration. To a large extent, baroque culture is one

such instrument of consolidation and legitimation of power. What nonetheless seems to me inspiring in baroque culture is its grain of subversion and eccentricity, the weakness of the centers of power that look for legitimation in it, the space of creativity and imagination it opens up, the turbulent sociability that it fosters. The configuration of baroque subjectivity that I wish to advance here is a collage of diverse historical and cultural materials, some of which in fact cannot be considered technically as belonging to the baroque period.

Baroque subjectivity lives comfortably with the temporary [\*1067] suspension of order and canons. As a subjectivity of transition, it depends both on the exhaustion and the aspiration of canons; its privileged temporality is perennial transitoriness. It lacks the obvious certainties of universal laws, in the same way that baroque style lacked the classical universalism of the Renaissance. Because it is unable to plan its own repetition ad infinitum, baroque subjectivity invests in the local, the particular, the momentary, the ephemeral and the transitory. But the local is not lived in a localist fashion, that is, it is not experienced as an orthotopia; the local aspires, rather, to invent another place, a heterotopia, if not even a utopia. Since it derives from a deep feeling of emptiness and disorientation caused by the exhaustion of the dominant canons, the comfort provided by the local is not the comfort of rest, but a sense of direction. Again, we can observe here a contrast with the Renaissance, as W<um o>lfllin has taught us: "In contrast to the Renaissance, which sought permanence and repose in everything, the baroque had from the first moment a definite sense of direction." n46

Baroque subjectivity is contemporaneous with all the elements that it integrates, and hence contemptuous of modernist evolutionism. Thus, we might say, baroque temporality is the temporality of interruption. Interruption is important on two accounts: it allows for reflexivity and surprise. Reflexivity is the self-reflexivity required by the lack of maps (without maps to guide our steps, we must tread with double care). Without self-reflexivity, in a desert of canons, the desert itself becomes canonical. Surprise, in turn, is really suspense; it derives from the suspension accomplished by interruption. By momentarily suspending itself, baroque subjectivity intensifies the will and arouses passion. The "baroque technique," argues Maravall, consists in "suspending resolution so as to encourage it, after that provisional and transitory moment of arrest, to push further more efficiently with the help of those retained and concentrated forces." n47

Interruption provokes wonder and novelty, and impedes closure and completion. Hence the unfinished and open-ended character of baroque sociability. The capacity for wonder, surprise and novelty is the energy that facilitates the struggle for an aspiration all the more convincing because it can never be completely fulfilled. The aim of baroque style, says Wölfflin, "is not to represent a perfect state, but to suggest an incomplete process and a moment towards its completion." n48

**[\*1068]** Baroque subjectivity has a very special relationship with forms. The geometry of baroque subjectivity is not Euclidean; it is fractal. Suspension of forms results from the extreme uses to which they are put: Maravall's *extremosidad*. n49 As regards baroque subjectivity, forms are the exercise of freedom par excellence. The great importance of the exercise of freedom justifies that forms be treated with extreme seriousness, though the extremism may result in the destruction of the forms themselves. The reason why Michelangelo is rightly considered one of baroque's forefathers is, according to Wölfflin, "because he treated forms with a violence, a terrible seriousness which could only find expression in formlessness." n50 This is what Michelangelo's contemporaries called *terribilita*. n51 The extremism in the use of forms is grounded on a will to grandiosity that is also the will to astound so well formulated by Bernini: "Let no one speak to me of what is small." n52 Extremism may be exercised in many different ways, to highlight simplicity or even asceticism as well as exuberance and extravagance, as Maravall has pointed out. Baroque extremism allows for ruptures emerging out of apparent continuities and keeps the forms in a permanently unstable state of bifurcation, in Prigogine's terms. n53 One of the most eloquent examples is Bernini's "The Mystical Ecstasy of Santa Teresa." In this sculpture, St. Teresa's expression is dramatized in such a way that the most intensely religious representation of the saint is one with the profane representation of a woman enjoying a deep orgasm. The representation of the sacred glides surreptitiously into the representation of the sacrilegious. Extremism of forms alone allows baroque subjectivity to entertain the turbulence and excitement necessary to continue the struggle for emancipatory causes, in a world in which emancipation has been collapsed into or absorbed by hegemonic regulation. To speak of extremism is to speak of archeological excavation into the regulatory magma in order to retrieve emancipatory fires, no matter how dim.

The same extremism that produces forms also devours them. This voracity takes on two forms: *sfumato* and *mestizaje*. In baroque painting, *sfumato* is the blurring of outlines and colors amongst objects, as clouds and

mountains, or the sea and the sky. *Sfumato* allows baroque subjectivity to create the near and the familiar among different intelligibilities, thus making cross-cultural dialogues possible and desirable. For instance, only by resorting to *sfumato* is it **[\*1069]** possible to give form to configurations that combine Western human rights with other conceptions of human dignity existing in other cultures. n54 The coherence of monolithic constructions disintegrates, its free-floating fragments remain open to new coherences and inventions of new multicultural forms. *Sfumato* is like a magnet that attracts the fragmentary forms into new constellations and directions, appealing to their most vulnerable, unfinished, open-ended contours. *Sfumato* is, in sum, an antifortress militancy.

*Mestizaje*, in its turn, is a way of pushing *sfumato* to its utmost, or extreme. While *sfumato* operates through disintegration of forms and retrieval of fragments, *mestizaje* operates through the creation of new forms of constellations of meaning, which are truly unrecognizable or blasphemous in light of their constitutive fragments. *Mestizaje* resides in the destruction of the logic that presides over the formation of each of its fragments, and in the construction of a new logic. This productive-destructive process tends to reflect the power relations among the original cultural forms (that is, among their supporting social groups) and this is why baroque subjectivity favors the *mestizajes* in which power relations are replaced by shared authority (*mestiza* authority). Latin America has provided a particularly fertile soil for *mestizaje*, and so the region is one of the most important excavation sites for the construction of baroque subjectivity. n55

*Sfumato* and *mestizaje* are the two constitutive elements of what I call, following Fernando Ortiz, *transculturation*. n56 In his justly famous book, *Contrapunteo Cubano*, originally published in 1940, Ortiz proposed the concept of *transculturation* to define the synthesis of the utterly intricate cultural processes of deculturation and neoculturation that have always characterized Cuban society. In his thinking, the reciprocal cultural shocks and discoveries, which in Europe occurred slowly throughout more than four millennia, **[\*1070]** occurred in Cuba by sudden jumps in less than four centuries. n57 The pre-Columbian *transculturations* between paleolithic and neolithic Indians were followed by many others after the European "hurricane" amongst various European cultures and between those ones and various African and Asian cultures. According to Ortiz, what distinguishes Cuba since the sixteenth century is the fact that all its cultures and peoples were all equally invaders, exogenous, all of them torn apart from their original cradle, haunted by separation and

transplantation to a new culture being created. n58 This permanent maladjustment and transitoriness allowed for new cultural constellations which cannot be reduced to the sum of the different fragments that contributed to them. The positive character of this constant process of transition between cultures is what Ortiz designates as transculturation. To reinforce this positive, new character, I prefer to speak of sfumato instead of deculturation and mestizaje instead of neoculturation. Transculturation designates, therefore, the voraciousness and extremism with which cultural forms are processed by baroque sociability. This self-same voraciousness and extremism are also quite present in Oswald de Andrade's concept of anthropophagy. n59

The extremism with which forms are lived by baroque subjectivity stresses the rhetorical artifactuality of practices, discourses, and modes of intelligibility. Artifice (artificium) is the foundation of a subjectivity suspended among fragments. Artifice allows baroque subjectivity to reinvent itself whenever the sociabilities it leads to tend to transform themselves into micro-orthodoxies. Through artifice, baroque subjectivity is simultaneously ludic and subversive, as the baroque feast so well illustrates. The importance of the feast in baroque culture, both in Europe and in Latin America, is well documented. n60 The feast turned baroque culture into the first instance of a mass culture of modernity. Its ostentatious and celebratory character was used by political and ecclesiastical powers to dramatize their greatness and reinforce their control over the masses. However, through its three basic components - disproportion, laughter and subversion - the baroque [\*1071] feast is invested with an emancipatory potential.

The baroque feast is out of proportion: an extremely large investment of time and energy is needed for a short-lived event. As Maravall says, "abundant and expensive means are used, a considerable effort is exerted, ample preparations are made, a complicated apparatus is set up, all that only to obtain some extremely short-lived effects, whether in the form of pleasure or surprise." n61 Nevertheless, disproportion generates a special intensification that, in turn, gives rise to the will to motion, the tolerance for chaos and the taste for turbulence, without which, the struggle for the paradigmatic transition cannot take place.

Disproportion makes wonder, surprise, artifice and novelty possible. But above all, it makes playful distance and laughter possible. Because laughter is not easily codifiable, capitalist modernity declared war on mirth, and so laughter was considered frivolous, improper, eccentric, if not blasphemous. Laughter was to be admitted only in highly codified contexts of the

entertainment industry. This phenomenon can also be observed among modern anti-capitalist social movements (labor parties, unions and even the new social movements) that banned laughter and play, lest they subvert the seriousness of resistance. Particularly interesting is the case of unions, whose activities initially had a strong ludic and festive element (workers' feasts) but, gradually suffocated, until at last, union activity became deadly serious and deeply anti-erotic. The banishment of laughter and play is part of what Max Weber calls the Entz<um a>uberung of the modern world.

The reinvention of social emancipation, which I suggest can be achieved by delving into baroque sociability, aims at the reenchantment of common sense, which in itself presupposes the carnivalization of emancipatory social practices and the eroticism of laughter and play. As Oswald de Andrade said: "Joy is counter proof." n62 The carnivalization of emancipatory social practice has an important self-reflexive dimension: it makes the de-canonization and subversion of such practices possible. A de-canonizing practice which does not know how to decanonize itself, falls easily into orthodoxy. Likewise, a subversive activity which does not know how to subvert itself, falls easily into regulatory routine.

And now, finally, the third emancipatory feature of the baroque feast: subversion. By carnivalizing social practices, the baroque feast displays a subversive potential that increases as the feast distances itself from the centers of power, but that is always there, even when the centers of power themselves are the promoters of the feast. Little [\*1072] wonder, then, that this subversive feature was much more noticeable in the colonies. Writing about carnival in the 1920's, the great Peruvian intellectual Mariátegui asserted that, even though it had been appropriated by the bourgeoisie, carnival was indeed revolutionary, because, by turning the bourgeois into a wardrobe, it was a merciless parody of power and the past. n63 Garcia de Leon also describes the subversive dimension of baroque feasts and religious processions in the Mexican port of Vera Cruz in the seventeenth century. n64 Up front marched the highest dignitaries of the viceroyalty in their full regalia - politicians, clergymen and military men; at the end of the procession followed the populace, mimicking their betters in gesture and attire, and thus provoking laughter and merriment among the spectators. n65 This symmetrical inversion at the beginning and the end of the procession is a cultural metaphor for the upside-down world - *el mundo al revés* - which was typical of Vera Cruz sociability at the time: "mulattas" dressed up as queens, slaves wore silk garments, whores pretended to be honest women and honest women

pretended to be whores; Africanized Portuguese and Indianized Spaniards. n66 This mundo al revés is also celebrated by Oswald de Andrade in *Anthropophagous Manifesto*: "But we have never admitted to the birth of logic among us ... Only where there is mystery is there no determinism. But what have we to do with this? We have never been catechized. We live in a sleepwalking law. We made Christ be born in Bahia. Or in Belem-Para." n67

In the feast, subversion is codified; it transgresses order although it knows the place of order and does not question it; but the code itself is subverted by the sfumato between feast and daily sociability. In the peripheries, transgression is almost a necessity. It is transgressive because it does not know how to be order, even though it knows that order exists. Therefore, baroque subjectivity privileges margins and peripheries as fields for the reconstruction of emancipatory energies.

The combination of these characteristics turns the sociability generated by baroque subjectivity into a sub-codified sociability: somewhat chaotic, inspired by a centrifugal imagination, positioned [\*1073] between despair and vertigo, celebrating revolt and revolutionizing celebration. Such sociability cannot but be emotional and passionate, the feature that most distinguishes baroque subjectivity from high modernity, or first modernity in Lash's terms. n68 High modern rationality, particularly after Descartes, condemns the emotions and the passions as obstacles to the progress of knowledge and truth. Cartesian rationality, says Toulmin, claims to be "intellectually perfectionist, morally rigorous, and humanly unrelenting." n69 Not much of human life and social practice fits into such a conception of rationality, but it is nonetheless quite attractive to those who cherish the stability and hierarchy of universal rules. Hirschman, in his turn, has clearly shown the elective affinities between this form of rationality and emergent capitalism. n70 Inasmuch as the interests of people and groups began centering around economic advantage, the interests that were previously considered passions became the opposite of passions and even the tapers of passion. From then on, says Hirschman, "in the pursuit of their interests men were expected or assumed to be steadfast, single-minded and methodical, in total contrast to the stereotyped behavior of men who are buffeted and blinded by their passions." n71 The objective was, of course, to create a "one dimensional" human personality. And Hirschman concludes: "In sum, capitalism was supposed to accomplish exactly what was soon to be denounced as its worst feature." n72

Cartesian and capitalist recipes are of little use for the reconstruction of a human personality with the capacity and desire for social emancipation. The meaning of the emancipatory struggles at the beginning of the twenty-first century can neither be deduced from demonstrative knowledge nor from an estimate of interests. Thus, the excavation undertaken by baroque subjectivity in this domain, more than in any other, must concentrate on suppressed or eccentric traditions of modernity, representations that occurred in the physical or symbolic peripheries where the control of hegemonic representations was weaker - the Vera Cruzes of modernity - or earlier, more chaotic representations of modernity that occurred before the Cartesian closure. For example, baroque subjectivity looks for inspiration in Montaigne and the concrete and erotic intelligibility of his life. In his essay "Of experience," after saying that he hates remedies that are more troublesome than the disease, [\*1074] Montaigne writes:

"To be subjected to the stone and subjected to abstaining from the pleasure of eating oysters, those are two troubles for one. The disease pinches us on one side, the rule on the other. Since there is the risk of making a mistake, let us risk it rather in pursuit of pleasure. The world does the opposite, and thinks nothing beneficial that is not painful; it is suspicious of ease." n73

As Cassirer and Toulmin have shown for the Renaissance and the Enlightenment respectively, each era creates a subjectivity that is congruent with the new intellectual, social, political, and cultural challenges. n74 The baroque ethos is the building block of a form of subjectivity and sociability interested in and capable of confronting the hegemonic forms of globalization, thereby opening the space for counter-hegemonic possibilities. Such possibilities are not fully developed and cannot by themselves promise a new era. But they are consistent enough to provide the grounding for the idea that we are entering a period of paradigmatic transition, an in-between era and therefore an era that is eager to follow the impulse of mestizaje, sfumato, hybridization and all the other features that I have attributed to the baroque ethos, and hence to *Nuestra America*. The progressive credibility conquered by the forms of subjectivity and sociability nurtured by such ethos will gradually translate into new interstitial normativities. Both Marti and Andrade have in mind a new kind of law and a new kind of rights. n75 For them the right to be equal involves the right to be different, as the right to be different involves the right to be equal. Andrade's metaphor of anthropophagy is a call for such a complex interlegality. n76 It is

formulated from the perspective of subaltern difference, the only "other" recognized Eurocentric high modernity. The interstitial normative fragments we collect in Nuestra America will provide the seeds for a new "natural" law, a cosmopolitan law, a law from below, to be found in the streets where survival and creative transgression fuse in an everyday-life pattern.

In the following I elaborate on this new normativity in which redistribution and recognition come together to build the new emancipatory blueprints, which I have called New Manifestos. But [\*1075] before that, I want to dwell for a moment on the difficulties confronted by the Nuestra American project throughout the twentieth century. They help illuminate the emancipatory tasks ahead.

### C. Counter-Hegemony in the Twentieth Century

The Nuestra America American Century was a century of counter-hegemonic possibilities, many of them following the tradition of others in the nineteenth century after the independence of Haiti in 1804. Among such possibilities, we might count the Mexican Revolution of 1910; the Indigenous movement headed by Quintin Lame in Colombia, 1914; the Sandinist movement in Nicaragua in the 1920's and 1930's, and its triumph in the 1980's; and the radical democratization of Guatemala in 1944; the rise of Peronism in 1946; the triumph of the Cuban Revolution in 1959; Allende's rise to power in 1970; the Landless Movement in Brazil since the 1980's; and the Zapatist Movement since 1994.

The overwhelming majority of these emancipatory experiences were aimed against the European American Century or, at least, had for background the latter's political ambitions and hegemonic ideas. Indeed, the American, neoliberal, hegemonic globalization, which now-a-days spreads throughout the entire globe, had its training field in Nuestra America since the beginning of the twentieth century. Not allowed to be the New World on the same footing with European America, Nuestra America was forced to be the Newest World of the European America. This poisoned privilege turned Nuestra America into a fertile field of cosmopolitan, emancipatory, counter-hegemonic experiences, as exhilarating as painful, as radiant in their promises as frustrating in their fulfillments.

What failed and why in the Nuestra America American Century? It would be silly to propose an inventory before such an open future as ours. Nonetheless, I'll risk a few thoughts, which actually claim to account more for the future than the past. In the first place, to

live in the "monster's entrails" is no easy matter. It does allow for a deep knowledge of the beast, as Marti so well demonstrates, but, on the other hand, it makes it very difficult to come out alive, even when one heeds Marti's admonishment: "The North must be left behind." n77 In my way of thinking, Nuestra America has been doubly living in the monster's entrails: because it shares with European America the continent that the latter had always conceived of as its vital space and zone of privileged influence; and because, as Marti says in Nuestra America, "Nuestra America is the working America," n78 and, thus, in its relations with European America, it shares the same [\*1076] tensions and sorrows that plague the relations between workers and capitalists. In this latter sense, Nuestra America has failed no more or no less than the workers of the entire world in their struggle against capital.

My second thought is that Nuestra America did not have to fight only against the imperial visits of its northern neighbor. The latter took over and became at home in the South, not just socializing with the natives but becoming a very native in the form of local elites and their transnational alliances with United States interests. The Southern Prospero was present in Sarmiento's political-cultural project, namely in the interests of agrarian and industrial bourgeoisie, especially after World War II in the military dictatorships of the 1960s and 1970s, in the fight against the communist threat and in the drastic neoliberal structural adjustment. In this sense, Nuestra America had to live trapped in and dependent on European America, just like Caliban vis-a-vis Prospero. That is why Latin American's violence has taken the form of civil war much more often than the form of the Bay of Pigs.

My third thought concerns the absence of hegemony in the counter-hegemonic field. While it is a crucial instrument of class domination in complex societies, the concept of hegemony is equally crucial inside the struggles against such domination. Among the oppressed or dominated groups, one group must emerge that is capable of converting its specific interests in liberation into the common interests of all the oppressed and thus become hegemonic. Gramsci, we recall, was convinced that the workers constituted the group in question. We do know that things did not happen like that in the capitalist world, less so today than in Gramsci's own time, and far less so in Nuestra America than in Europe or European America. Indigenous, peasants, workers, petitbourgeois, black movements and struggles always occurred in isolation, antagonizing one another without a theory of translation and devoid of the Manifesto practices referred to above. One of the weaknesses of Nuestra America, actually quite obvious in Marti's work, was

to overestimate the communality of interests and the possibilities of uniting around them. Rather than uniting, Nuestra America underwent a process of Balkanization. Before this fragmentation, the union of European America became more efficacious. European America united around the idea of national identity and a manifest destiny: a promised land destined to fulfill its promises at any cost for the outsiders.

My final thought concerns the cultural project of Nuestra America itself. In my mind, contrary to Marti's wishes, the European and North American Universities never gave way entirely to the American University. Witness the "pathetic bovarism of writers and scholars ... which leads some Latin Americans ... to imagine [\*1077] themselves as exiled metropolitans. For them a work produced in the transatlantic periphery ... merits their interest only when it has received the metropolis's [sic] approval, an approval that gives them the eyes with which to see it." n79

Contrary to Ortiz's claim, transculturation was never total, and in fact it was undermined by power differences among the different components that contributed to it. For a very long time, and perhaps more so today at a time of vertiginous deterritorialized transculturation in the guise of hybridization, the questions about the inequality of power remained unanswered: who hybridizes whom and what? With what results? And in whose benefit? What, in the process of transculturation, did not go beyond deculturation or sfumato and why? If indeed it is true that most cultures were invaders, it is no less true that some invaded as masters, and some as slaves. It is perhaps not risky today, sixty years later, to think that Oswald de Andrade's anthropophagous optimism was exaggerated: "But no Crusaders came. Only runaways from a civilization which we are eating up, because we are strong and vengeful like the Jabuti." n80

The European American Century ended triumphantly, the protagonist of the last incarnation of the capitalist world system - hegemonic globalization. On the contrary, the Nuestra America American Century ended sorrowfully. Latin America has imported many of the evils that Marti had seen in the monster's entrails, and the enormous emancipatory creativity it has demonstrated - the Zapata and Sandino movements, the indigenous and peasant movements, Allende in 1970 and Fidel in 1959, the social movements, the ABC trade unions movement, the participatory budgeting in many Brazilian cities, the landless movement, the Zapatist movement - either ended in frustration or face an uncertain future. This uncertainty is all the greater since it is foreseeable that extreme polarization in the distribution of world wealth during the last decades, should it go on, will require an

even more despotic system of repression worldwide than what exists now. With remarkable forethought, Darcy Ribeiro wrote in 1979: "The means of repression required to maintain this system threaten to impose upon all the peoples such rigid and despotically efficient regimes as are without parallel in the history of iniquity." n81 It comes as no surprise that the intellectual and social climate of Latin America has been invaded in the past decades by a wave of cynical reason, a cultural pessimism utterly unrecognizable from the point of view of Nuestra [\*1078] America.

#### D. Counter-Hegemonic Possibilities for the Twenty-First Century: Towards New Manifestos

In the light of the preceding sections, the question must be asked whether Nuestra America has in fact conditions to continue to symbolize a utopian will to emancipation and counter-hegemonic globalization, based on the mutual implication of equality and difference. I answer in the positive but only depending on the following condition: Nuestra America must be deterritorialized and turned into the metaphor for the struggle of the victims of hegemonic globalization wherever they may be, North or South, East or West. If we revisit the founding ideas of Nuestra America, we observe that the transformations of the last decades have created conditions for them to occur and flourish today in other parts of the world. Let us examine some of them. First, the exponential increase of trans-border interactions - of emigrants, students, refugees, as well as executives, and tourists - is giving rise to new forms of mestizaje, anthropophagy and transculturation all over the world. The world becomes increasingly a world of invaders cut off from an origin they never had or, if they did, they suffered therein the original experience of being invaded. Against celebratory postmodernism, more attention must be paid than that paid in the first century of Nuestra America to the power of the different participants in the processes of mestizaje. Such inequalities accounted for the perversion both of the politics of difference (recognition became a form of miscognition) and the politics of equality (redistribution ended up as the new forms of poor relief advocated by the World Bank and IMF).

Second, the recent ugly revival of racism in the North points to an aggressive defense against the unstoppable construction of the multiple little humankind Bolivar talked about, where races cross and interpenetrate in the margins of repression and discrimination. As the Cuban, in Marti's voice, could proclaim to be more than black, mulatto or white, so the South African, Mozambican, New Yorker, Parisian, Londoner can proclaim today to be more than black, white, mulatto,

Indian, Kurd, Arab, etc. Third, the demand to produce or sustain situated and contextualized knowledge is today a global claim against the ignorance and silencing effect produced by modern science as it is used by hegemonic globalization. This epistemological issue gained enormous relevance in recent times with the newest developments of biotechnology and genetic engineering and the consequent struggle to defend biodiversity from biopiracy. In this domain, Latin America, one of the great holders of biodiversity, continues to be the home of *Nuestra America*, but many other countries in Africa or Asia are in this position. Fourth, as hegemonic [\*1079] globalization has deepened, the "entrails of the monster" n82 have drawn closer to many other peoples in other continents. The closeness effect is today produced by information, communication, capitalism, and by a consumer society. Hereby are multiplied both the grounds for the cynical reason and the postcolonial impulse. No other counter-hegemonic internationalism seems to loom in the horizon but the chaotic and fragmentary internationalisms have become part of our quotidian. In a word, the new *Nuestra America* has today conditions to globalize itself and thereby propose new emancipatory alliances to the old, since localized *Nuestra America*.

The counter-hegemonic nature of *Nuestra America* lies in its potential to develop a progressive transnational political culture. Such political culture will concentrate on (1) identifying the multiple local/global linkages among struggles, movements, and initiatives; (2) promoting the clashes between hegemonic globalization trends and pressures, on one side, and the transnational coalitions to resist against them, on the other, thus opening up possibilities for counter-hegemonic globalizations; and (3) promoting internal and external self-reflexivity so that the forms of redistribution and recognition that are established among the movements mirror the forms of redistribution and recognition that transnational emancipatory sub-politics wishes to see implemented in the world.

### III. Towards New Manifestos

In 1998, the Communist Manifesto celebrated its 150th anniversary. n83 The Manifesto is one of the landmark texts of western modernity. In a few pages and with unsurpassing clarity, Marx and Engels offer there a global view of society in their own time, a general theory of historical development, and a short- and long-term political program. The Manifesto is a Eurocentric document that conveys an unswerving faith in progress, acclaims the bourgeoisie as the revolutionary class that made it possible, and, by the

same token, prophesizes the defeat of the bourgeoisie vis-a-vis the proletariat as the emergent class capable of guaranteeing the continuity of progress beyond bourgeois limits.

Some of the themes, analyses, and appeals included in the Manifesto are nowadays still up-to-date. However, Marx's prophecies were never fulfilled. Capitalism did not succumb at the hands of the enemies by itself created and the communist alternative failed utterly. Capitalism globalized itself far more effectively than the [\*1080] proletarian movement, while the latter's successes, namely in the more developed countries, consisted in humanizing, rather than overcoming, capitalism.

Nonetheless, the social evils denounced by the Manifesto are today as grievous as then. The progress meanwhile achieved went hand in hand with wars that killed and go on killing millions of people, and the gap between the rich and the poor has never before been so wide as today. As I mentioned above, facing such reality, I believe that it is necessary to create the conditions for not one but several new Manifestos to emerge, with the potential to mobilize all the progressive forces of the world. By progressive forces are meant all those unreconciled with the spread of societal fascism, which they do not see as inevitable, and who therefore go on fighting for alternatives. The complexity of the contemporary world and the increasing visibility of its great diversity and inequality render impossible the translation of principles of action into one single manifesto. I have therefore in mind several manifestos, each one of them opening up possible paths toward an alternative society vis-a-vis societal fascism.

Moreover, unlike the Communist Manifesto, the new manifestos will not be the achievement of individual scientists observing the world from one privileged perspective alone. Rather, they will be far more multicultural and indebted to different paradigms of knowledge, and will emerge, by virtue of translation, networking, and mestizaje, in "conversations of humankind" n84 involving social scientists and activists engaged in social struggles all over the world.

The new manifestos must focus on those themes and alternatives that carry more potential to build counter-hegemonic globalizations in the next decades. In my view, the five following themes are the most important ones in this respect. In regard to each one of them, *Nuestra America* provides a vast field of historical experience. *Nuestra America* thus emerges as the most privileged site where to confront the challenges posed by the emergent transnational political culture. I hereby enumerate the five themes without any order of precedence.

1. Participatory Democracy. Along with the hegemonic model of democracy (liberal, representative democracy), other, subaltern models of democracy have always coexisted, no matter how marginalized or discredited. We live in paradoxical times: at the very moment of its most convincing triumphs across the globe, liberal democracy becomes less and less credible and convincing not only in [\*1081] the "new frontier" countries but also in the countries where it has its deepest roots. The twin crises of representation and participation are the most visible symptoms of such deficit of credibility and, in last instance, of legitimacy. On the other hand, local, regional, and national communities in different parts of the world are undertaking democratic experiments and initiatives, based on alternative models of democracy, in which the tensions between capitalism and democracy and between redistribution and recognition become alive and turn into positive energy behind new, more comprehensive and more just social contracts, no matter how locally circumscribed they may be. n85 In some countries in Africa, Latin America and Asia, traditional forms of authority and self-government are being revisited to explore the possibility of their internal transformation and articulation with other forms of democratic rule.

2. Alternative Production Systems. A market economy is of course possible and, within limits, even desirable. On the contrary, a market society is impossible and, if possible, would be morally repugnant, and indeed ungovernable. A market society would lead to societal fascism. One possible response to societal fascism are alternative production systems. Discussions about counter-hegemonic globalization tends to focus on social, political, and cultural initiatives, only rarely focusing on the economic ones, that is, on local/global initiatives consisting of non-capitalist production and distribution of goods and services, whether in rural or urban settings: cooperatives, mutualities, credit systems, farming of invaded land by landless peasants, sustainable water systems and fishing communities, ecological logging, etc. These initiatives are those in which local/global linkages are most difficult to establish, if for no other reason because they confront more directly the logic of global capitalism behind hegemonic globalization, not only at the level of production but also at the level of distribution. Another important facet of alternative production systems is that they are never exclusively economic in nature. They mobilize social and cultural resources in such a way as to prevent the reduction of social value to market price.

3. Emancipatory Multicultural Justices and Citizenships. The crisis of western modernity has shown that the failure of progressive projects

concerning the improvement of life chances and life conditions of subordinate groups, both inside and outside the Western world was in part due to lack of cultural legitimacy. This failure applies even to human rights movements, since the [\*1082] universality of human rights cannot be taken for granted. n86 The idea of human dignity can be formulated in different "languages." Rather than being suppressed in the name of postulated universalisms, such differences must be mutually intelligible through translation and what I call diatopical hermeneutics. By diatopical hermeneutics I understand an interpretation of isomorphic concerns of different cultures conducted by partners capable of and willing to argue with one foot in one culture and the other foot in another. n87

Since modern nation building was accomplished more often than not by smashing the cultural and national identity of minorities (and sometimes even majorities), the recognition of multiculturalism and multinationhood carries with itself the aspiration to self-determination; that is to say, the aspiration to equal recognitions and differentiated equalities. The case of the indigenous peoples is paramount in this regard. Even though all cultures are relative, relativism is wrong as a philosophical stance. It is therefore imperative to develop (transcultural?) criteria to distinguish emancipatory from retrogressive forms of multiculturalism or self-determination.

The aspiration to multiculturalism and self-determination often takes the social form of a struggle for justice and citizenship. It involves the claims for alternative forms of law and justice, as well as for new regimes of citizenship. The plurality of legal orders, which has become more visible with the crisis of the nation-state, carries with itself, either implicitly or explicitly, the idea of multiple citizenships coexisting in the same geopolitical field and, hence, the idea of the existence of first-, second-, and third-class citizens. However, non-state legal orders may also be the embryo of non-state public spheres and the institutional base for self-determination, as in the case of indigenous justice: forms of community, informal, local, popular justice that are part and parcel of struggles or initiatives pertaining to any of the three above mentioned themes. For instance, community or popular justice as an integral component of participatory democracy initiatives; indigenous justice as an integral component of self-determination or conservation of biodiversity. The concept of "multicultural citizenship" n88 is the privileged site upon which to ground the kind of mutual implication of redistribution and recognition that I am advocating in this article.



4. Biodiversity, Rival Knowledges, and Intellectual Property Rights. Due to the advancement of the last decades in the [\*1083] life sciences, biotechnology and microelectronics, biodiversity has become one of the most precious and looked after natural resources. For biotechnology and pharmaceutical firms, biodiversity appears increasingly at the core of the most spectacular and, thus, profitable product developments in the years ahead. By and large, biodiversity occurs mainly in the so-called Third World, predominantly in territories historically owned or long occupied by indigenous peoples. While technologically advanced countries seek to extend intellectual property rights and patent law to biodiversity, some peripheral countries, indigenous peoples groups and transnational advocacy networks on their behalf are seeking to guarantee the conservation and reproduction of biodiversity by granting special protected status to the territories, ways of life, and traditional knowledges of indigenous and peasant communities. It is increasingly evident that the new cleavages between the North and the South will be centered around the question of access to biodiversity on a global scale.

Though all the above-mentioned themes raise an epistemological issue, to the extent that they claim the validity of knowledges that have been discarded by hegemonic scientific knowledge, biodiversity is probably the topic in which the clash between rival knowledges is more evident and eventually more unequal and violent. Here equality and difference are the building blocks on new mestiza epistemological claims.

5. New Labor Internationalism. As is well known, due to global capitalization rather than the labor movement, labor internationalism was one of the most blatantly unfulfilled predictions of the Communist Manifesto. The labor movement organized itself at the national level and, at least in the core countries, became increasingly dependent upon the Welfare State. It is true that in our century, international links and organizations have kept alive the idea of labor internationalism, but they became prey to the Cold War, following the same fate as that of the Cold War.

In the post-cold-war period and as a response to the more aggressive bouts of hegemonic globalization, precarious and new forms of labor internationalism have emerged: the debate on labor standards; exchanges, agreements or even institutional congregation among labor unions of different countries integrating the same economic regional bloc (NAFTA, European Union, Mercosul); articulation among struggles, claims, and demands of the different labor

unions representing the workers working for the same multinational corporation in different countries, etc.

Even more directly than alternative-production systems, the new labor internationalism confronts the logic of global capitalism on its own privileged ground: the economy. Its success is dependent upon the "extra-economic" linkages it will be able to build with the [\*1084] struggles clustered around all the other five themes. Such linkages will be crucial to transform the politics of equality that dominated the old labor internationalism into a new political and cultural mix of equality and difference.

None of these themes or thematic initiatives taken separately will succeed in bringing about transnational emancipatory sub-politics or counter-hegemonic globalization. To be successful, their emancipatory concerns must undergo translation and networking, expanding in evermore socially hybrid but politically focused movements. In a nutshell, what is at stake in political terms at the beginning of the century is the reinvention of the state and civil society in such a way that societal fascism will vanish as a possible future. This is to be accomplished through the proliferation of local/global public spheres in which nation-states are important partners but not exclusive dispensers of either legitimacy or hegemony.

#### IV. Conclusion: Which Side Are You On, Ariel?

Starting from an analysis of Nuestra America as the subaltern view of the American continent throughout the twentieth century, I identified Nuestra America's counter-hegemonic potential and indicated some of the reasons why it failed to fulfill itself. Revisiting the historical trajectory of Nuestra America and its cultural conscience, the baroque ethos, and proceeding on that basis, I then reconstructed the forms of sociability and subjectivity that might be interested in and capable of confronting the challenges posed by counter-hegemonic globalizations. The symbolic expansion, made possible by a metaphorical interpretation of Nuestra America, reflected a blueprint of the new transnational political culture called for in the new century and millennium. The normative claims of this political culture are embedded in the lived experiences of the people for whom Nuestra America speaks on behalf of. Such claims, however embryonic and interstitial, point to a new kind of "natural law" - a situated, contextualized, post-colonial, multicultural bottom-up cosmopolitan law.

The fact that the five themes selected as testing grounds and playing fields of the new political culture have deep roots in Latin America justifies from an historical and political point of view the symbolic

expansion of the idea of *Nuestra America* proposed in this article. However, in order not to repeat the frustrations of the last century, this symbolic expansion must go one step further and include the most neglected trope in the *Nuestra America* mythos: Ariel, the spirit of air in Shakespeare's *The Tempest*. Like Caliban, Ariel is Prospero's slave. However, besides not being deformed like Caliban, Ariel receives much better treatment from Prospero, who [\*1085] promises him freedom if he serves Prospero faithfully. As we have seen, *Nuestra America* has looked upon itself predominantly as Caliban in constant and unequal struggle against Prospero. This is how Oswald de Andrade, Aime Cesaire, Edward Brathwaite, George Lamming, Retamar, and many others see it. n89 While this is the dominant vision, it is not the only one. For instance, in 1898 the Franco-Argentinian writer Paul Groussac spoke of the need to defend the old European and Latin American civilization against the "Calibanesque Yankee." n90 On the other hand, the ambiguous figure of Ariel inspired several interpretations. In 1900, the writer Jose Enrique Rodo published his own Ariel, in which he identified Latin America with Ariel, while implicitly identifying North America gets identified with Caliban. n91 In 1935, the Argentine Anibal Ponce saw Ariel as an intellectual, tied to Prospero in a less brutal way than Caliban, but nonetheless at his service, much according to the model that renaissance humanism conceived for the intellectuals: "a mixture of slave and mercenary," indifferent to action and conformist vis-a-vis the established order. n92 This is the intellectual Ariel reinvented by Aime Cesaire in his play of the late 1960's: *Une Tempete; d'apres La Tempete de Shakespeare*. Adaptation pour un theatre negre. n93 Now turned into a mulatto, Ariel is the intellectual permanently in crisis.

This said, I suggest it is high time we give a new symbolic identification to Ariel and ascertain of what use he can be for the promotion of the emancipatory ideal of *Nuestra America*. I shall conclude, therefore, by presenting Ariel as a baroque angel undergoing three transfigurations. His first transfiguration is Cesaire's mulatto Ariel. Against racism and xenophobia, Ariel represents transculturation and multiculturalism, mestizaje of flesh and spirit. In this mestizaje the possibility of interracial tolerance and intercultural dialogue is inscribed. The mulatto Ariel is the metaphor of a possible synthesis between recognition and equality.

Ariel's second transfiguration is Gramsci's intellectual, who exercises self-reflexivity in order to know on whose side he is and what use he can be. This Ariel is unequivocally on the side of Caliban, on the side of all the oppressed peoples and groups of the world, and

keeps a constant epistemological and political vigilance on himself lest his help becomes useless or even counterproductive. This Ariel is an intellectual trained in Marti's university.

[\*1086] The third and last transfiguration is more complex. As a mulatto and an organic intellectual, Ariel is a figure of intermediation. In spite of the most recent transformations of world economy, I still think that there are countries (regions, or sectors) of intermediary development which perform the function of intermediation between the core and the periphery of the world system. Particularly important in this regard are countries like Brazil, Mexico, and India. The first two countries only came to recognize their multicultural and pluriethnic characters at the end of the twentieth century. Such recognition came at the end of a painful historical process in the course of which the suppression of difference, n94 rather than opening up the space for republican equality, it led to the most abject forms of inequality. Just like the Ariel in Shakespeare's play, rather than uniting amongst themselves with many others coming from Caliban-countries, these intermediation countries have used their economic and populational weight to gain privileged treatment from Prospero. They act in isolation hoping to maximize their possibilities of success alone.

As I have argued in this article, the potential of their populations for engaging in transnational emancipatory sub-politics and, in counter-hegemonic globalizations depends upon their capacity to transfigure themselves into an Ariel unequivocally solidarity with Caliban. In this symbolic transfiguration resides the most important political task of the next decades. On them depends the possibility of a second century of *Nuestra America* with greater success than the first one.

#### FOOTNOTE-1:

n1. See Edward Gibbon, *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* 34-39 (J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd. 1974) (1910) (illustrating the relations between the Pope and the feudal lords concerning the crusades).

n2. See Walter Benjamin, "Uber den Begriff der Geschichte." In *Gesammelte Schriften*. Werkausgabe. Vol. II (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 1980).

n3. See Boaventura de Sousa Santos, *Reinventar a Democracia* (Lisboa, Gradiva 1998).

n4. See Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation* 126-29 (Boston, MA: Beacon Press 1944); Joseph A.

Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy* 156-63 (New York, Harper & Row, Publ., Inc. 1942).

n5. See, e.g., Zygmunt Bauman, *Globalization: The Human Consequences* (New York, Columbia University Press 1998); Manuel Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society* (Cambridge, MA, Blackwell 1996); *Chaos and Governance in the Modern World System* (Giovanni Arrighi & Beverly Silver eds., Minneapolis, Minnesota University Press 1999); Michel Chossudovsky, *The Globalisation of Poverty: Impacts of IMF and World Bank Reforms* (London, Zed Books 1997); *The Cultures of Globalization* (Jameson Fredric & Masao Miyoshi eds., Durham, Duke University Press 1999); Arturo Escobar, *Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World* (Princeton, Princeton University Press 1995); Terence K. Hopkins & Immanuel Wallerstein, *The World-System: Is There a Crisis?*, in *The Age of Transition: Trajectory of the World-System, 1945-2025* 2-3 (Terence K. Hopkins & Immanuel Wallerstein eds., New Jersey, Zed Books 1996); *The Case Against the Global Economy: And for a Turn Toward the Local* (Jerry Mander & Edward Goldsmith, eds., San Francisco, Sierra Club Books 1996); George Ritzer, *The McDonalidization of Society*. 85-87 (Revised edition. Thousand Oaks, Pine Forge 1998); Roland Robertson, *Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture* 175 (London, Sage 1992).

n6. Jerry Mander, *Facing the Rising Tide*, in *The Case Against the Global Economy: And for a Turn Toward the Local*, supra note 5, at 18.

n7. Richard Douthwaite, *Is it Possible to Build a Sustainable World?*, in *Critical Development Theory: Contributions to a New Paradigm* 157, 171 (Ronald Munck & Denis O'Hearn eds., London, Zed Books 1999).

n8. Boaventura de Sousa Santos, *Toward a New Common Sense: Law, Science and Politics in the Paradigmatic Transition* 263-65 (New York, Routledge 1995) [hereinafter Santos, *Common Sense*].

n9. See generally Alison Brysk, *From Tribal Village to Global Village: Indian Rights and International Relations in Latin America* (Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press 2000); Margaret E. Keck & Kathryn Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics* (Ithaca, Cornell University Press 1998); Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics* (Peter Lange ed., 2d ed. 1998); Pablo Gonzalez Casanova, *The Theory of the Rain Forest Against Neoliberalism and for Humanity*, 53 *Thesis Eleven* 79-92 (1998); Peter Evans, *Fighting Marginalization with Transnational Networks: Counter-Hegemonic Globalization*, 29 *Contemporary Sociology* 1, 230-41 (2000).

n10. Scott Lash, *Another Modernity: A Different Rationality* 1, 5 (Oxford, Blackwell, 1999).

n11. Boaventura de Sousa Santos, *On Oppositional Postmodernism and Globalizations*, 23 [Law & Soc. Inquiry](#) 121-139 (1998) [hereinafter Santos, *Oppositional Postmodernism*].

n12. A brilliant exception is Michel de Montaigne's essay *Of Cannibals*, which was written at the very beginning of Eurocentric modernity. See Michel de Montaigne, *Of Cannibals*, in *Complete Essays of Montaigne* (Donald M. Frame trans., 1958).

n13. Roberto Fernandez Retamar, *Caliban: Notes Toward a Discussion of Culture in Our America*, in *Caliban and Other Essays* 3, 28 (Edward Baker trans., 1989).

n14. See Santos, *Oppositional Postmodernism*, supra note 11, at 134.

n15. Lash, supra note 10, at 2.

n16. See Retamar, supra note 13, at 17.

n17. *Id.* at 19-20.

n18. Jose Marti, *Obras Completas VIII* 336-337 (La Havana, Editorial Nacional de Cuba 1963. Please see acknowledgments in which the information about the translation is provided.)

n19. *Id.* at II 299.

n20. *Id.* at VI 22.

- n21. Oswald de Andrade, *A utopia antropofagica* (São Paulo, Globo, 1990). Please see note 18 on translation.
- n22. Fernando Ortiz, *Contrapunteo Cubano del Tabaco y el Azucar* (Barcelona, Ariel 1973).
- n23. Darcy Ribeiro, *Mestico e que e bom!* (with the collaboration of Oscar Niemeyer et al. Rio de Janeiro, Editora Revan 1996).
- n24. .Marti supra note 18, at VI 16.
- n25. .Id. at VI 17.
- n26. .Id. at VI 18.
- n27. .Id. at VI 17.
- n28. .Id. at VI 32.
- n29. .Id. at VI 16.
- n30. .Id. at VI 16-17.
- n31. Marti has particularly in mind one of the earliest southern formulations of Prospero's *America*, the work of Argentinean Domingo Sarmiento. See Domingo Sarmiento, *Facundo; civilization y barbarie*. (Mexico, Editorial Porrúa 1966).
- n32. Andrade, supra note 21, at 47-51. Please see note 18 on translation.
- n33. .Marti supra note 18, at VI 4-6.
- n34. .Id. at VI 160.
- n35. .Id. at II 368.
- n36. .Id. at II 368.
- n37. .Id. at VI 26-27.
- n38. Andrade, supra note 21, at 48. Please see note 18 on translation.
- n39. .Id. at 49. Please see note 18 on translation
- n40. Ulrich Beck, *Risk Society: Towards a new modernity* 24 (Mark Ritter trans., London, Sage 1992).
- n41. .Marti supra note 18, at VI 17.
- n42. Andrade, supra note 21, at 51. Please see note 18 on translation.
- n43. Santos, *Common Sense*, supra note 8, at 479.
- n44. See Bolívar Echevarría *Modernidad, Mestizaje, Cultura, Ethos Barroco* (Mexico, UNAM - El Equilibrista 1994). The baroque ethos I propound here is very different from the baroque melancholy proposed by Lash. See Lash, supra note 10, at 330-38. Our differences are due in part to the different loci of the baroque of which we base our analysis: Europe in the case of Lash, Latin America in my case.
- n45. Jose Antonio Maravall, *La Cultura del Barroco* 87 (Barcelona, Ariel 1975).
- n46. Heinrich Wölfflin, *Renaissance and Baroque* 67 (Kathrin Simon, trans., Ithaca, Cornell University Press 1979) (1961).
- n47. Maravall, supra note 45, at 445.
- n48. Wölfflin, supra note 46, at 67.
- n49. Maravall, supra note 45, at 421.
- n50. Wölfflin, supra note 46, at 82.
- n51. .Id.
- n52. Victor Tapie, *Barroco e Classicismo* II 188 (Lisboa, Presenca, 1988).
- n53. See generally Ilya Prigogine, *La Fin Des Certitudes* (Paris, Odile Jacob, 1996).
- n54. Boaventura de Sousa Santos, *Towards a Multicultural Conception of Human Rights*, in *Spaces of Culture: City, Nation, World* 214-229 (Mike Featherstone & Scott Lash, eds., London, Sage 1999) [hereinafter Santos, *Human Rights*].
- n55. See generally Alba Pastor et al., *Aproximaciones al Mundo Barroco Latino Americano* (Mexico, UNAM 1993) (discussing baroque art in Latin America); Solange Alberro, *Del Gachupin al Criollo* (Mexico, El Colegio de Mexico 1992); Paul Gilroy, *The Black Atlantic* (1993) (describing the mestizaje that characterizes the black cultural experience, an experience that is not specifically African, American, Caribbean or British, but all of them at one and the same time). In the Portuguese speaking world the work of Oswald de Andrade remains the most striking example of mestizaje; Andrade, supra note 22. With reference to Brazilian baroque Afranio Coutinho, see *O barroco e o maneirismo*, 4-5 *Claro Escuro* 15-16 (1990), where the author speaks of a "complex baroque mestizagem".
- n56. See generally Ortiz, supra note 22.

- n57. *Id.* at 131.
- n58. *Id.* at 132.
- n59. See generally Andrade, *supra* note 21.
- n60. See Antonio Garcia Leon, *Contrapunto Entre lo Barroco y lo Popular en el Vera Cruz Colonial*, a presentation done at Universidad Autonoma de Mexico on May 17-20, 1993, on the baroque feast in Mexico. Also, see the editorial perspective by Affonso Avila, entitled *O ludico e as projecções do mundo barroco - II* (São Paulo, Editora Perspectiva 1994). Lastly, see Henri Desroche, *La Societe Festive. Du fourierisme aux fourierismes pratiques* (Paris, Seuil 1975), which describes the relationship between "fourierisme" and the festive society.
- n61. Maravall, *supra* note 45, at 488.
- n62. Andrade, *supra* note 21, at 51.
- n63. See Jose Carlos Mariategui, *La Novela y La Vida* 127 (Sandro et al., eds., 2nd ed. 1959).
- n64. See generally Leon, *supra* note 60.
- n65. *Id.*
- n66. Avila concurs, stressing the mixture of religious and heathen motifs: "Amongst hords of negroes playing bagpipes, drums, fifes and trumpets, there would be, for example, an excellent German impersonator 'tearing apart the silence of the air with the loud sound of a clarinet,' while the believers devoutly carried religious banners or images." Avila, *supra* note 60, at 56.
- n67. Andrade, *supra* note 21, at 48.
- n68. Lash, *supra* note 10.
- n69. Stephen Toulmin, *Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity* 199-200 (New York, Free University Press 1990).
- n70. See generally Alberto Hirschman, *The Passions and the Interests* (Princeton, Princeton University Press 1977).
- n71. *Id.* at 54.
- n72. *Id.* at 132.
- n73. Michel de Montaigne, *Of Experience*, in *The Complete Essays of Montaigne* 815, 832 (Donald M. Frame trans., Stanford Univ. Press 1958) (1580).
- n74. Ernst Cassirer, *The Philosophy of the Enlightenment* 3 (Fritz C. A. Koelln & James P. Pettegrove eds., 1968); Ernst Cassirer, *The Individual and the Cosmos in Renaissance Philosophy* 123 (Mario Domandi trans., 1972); see also Toulmin, *supra* note 71, at 139-45.
- n75. Andrade, *supra* note 21; Marti, *supra* note 18.
- n76. Andrade, *supra* note 21.
- n77. Marti, *supra* note 18, at II 368.
- n78. Marti, *supra* note 18, at VI 23.
- n79. Retamar, *supra* note 13, at 82.
- n80. Andrade, *supra* note 21, at 50.
- n81. Darcy Ribeiro, *Ensaaios Insolitos* 40 (Porto Alegre, L & PM Editores 1979).
- n82. Jose Marti refers to the "entrails of the monster" in several passages of his work. See *supra* note 18.
- n83. Karl Marx, *The Communist Manifesto*, in *The Revolution of 1848 - Political Writings I* (London, Penguin Books 1973).
- n84. On "conversations of humankind" see John Dewey, *Democracy and Education: an Introduction to the Philosophy of Education* (New York, The Free Press 1966).
- n85. See Boaventura de Sousa Santos, *Participatory Budgeting in Porto Alegre: Toward a Redistribute Democracy*, 26 *Politics & Society* 4, 416-510 (1998).
- n86. Santos, *Human Rights*, *supra* note 54.
- n87. Santos, *Common Sense*, *supra* note 8, at 340-41.
- n88. Will Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights* 9 (David Miller & Alan Ryan eds., 1995).
- n89. Retamar, *supra* note 13, at 12-14.
- n90. See *id.* at 10.
- n91. Jose Enrique Rodo, *Ariel* (Madrid, Catedra, 2000).

n92. *Id.* at 11-12 (internal quotations omitted).

n93. Aime Cesaire, *Une Tempete; d'apres La Tempete de Shakespeare*. Adaptation pour un theatre negre (Paris, Seuil, 1969).

n94. For example, in Brazil "racial democracy" see Andradre, *supra* at note 22 and in Mexico, "assimilationism" and the mestizo as the "raza cosmica." See Roger Bartra, *Blood, ink, and culture: miseries and splendors of post-Mexican condition* (Mark Alan Healey, trans., Durham, Duke University Press, 2002).

