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ARTICLE: CLUSTER VI: Class, Economics, and Social Rights: Tying Racism in El Ejido to Spanish and European Politics

Manuel J. Caro*

BIO:

* Assistant Professor of Sociology and Criminology, Barry University; Ph. D. and M.A. Sociology, University of Miami; B.A. Sociology and Political Science, University of Granada Spain). I would like to thank Alvaro Blazquez and Angeles Garzon for keeping me posted about their experiences as lawyers in the aftermath of El Ejido's riots.

SUMMARY: ... El Ejido is a town on the Mediterranean coast of the southeastern corner of Spain. ... What could possibly have made the inhabitants of El Ejido do this? What were the living conditions of the Moroccan immigrants before and after these shameful events? Can these conditions and riots be traced to the immigration policies of Spain and the rest of the European countries, which are now a combined territory without internal borders? These are the questions that I will try to answer in this Article. ... This latter foreigner is an immigrant, an economic immigrant, who needs to be restrained and controlled if Spain is to maintain a certain order and if jobs are not to be taken away from Spaniards. ... For Spaniards, it is important to preserve their culture from those foreigners who are not traveling to Spain to enjoy the country's cultural traits and folklore. ... Moroccan immigrants in El Ejido live in a sort of apartheid that is designed in part by the local government. ... Contemporary Spain, which is increasingly more ethnically diverse, is being constructed on the very base that fuels these violent ethnic conflicts: that is racism, even if it is now European rather than simply Spanish. ...

[*893]

I. Introduction

El Ejido is a town on the Mediterranean coast of the southeastern corner of Spain. Its population, whose livelihood depends mainly on agriculture, has doubled and its income per capita has climbed to be among the highest in Spain in the last fifteen years. El Ejido's

landscape and its adjacent towns look like a gray sea of plastic that, from a distance, shines as much as the nearby Mediterranean. This miracle is due to the implementation of greenhouse-related techniques and genetic advancements in agriculture. But this miracle is also due to the availability of cheap labor that is willing to work long hours under extreme conditions of heat and humidity - the temperature inside the greenhouses can surpass 113°F on a sunny summer afternoon. Without such human labor, technological advances would have amounted to nothing.

Although natives suffer from high rates of unemployment in Southern Spain, they prefer not to work in the greenhouses for as little as \$ 3.50 an hour - the lowest agricultural salary in Spain. As a result, cheap foreign labor is brought from the nearby Maghreb area of Africa. The Maghreb, literally translated, means the westernmost part of Islam, the area of Africa that is comprised of Morocco, Tunisia, Mauritania, Algeria, and Libya. This area of Africa has been a source of emigration to Europe since the end of formal imperialism. France, Germany, and Belgium have been the usual targets of this emigration. At the beginning of the eighties, however, Spain joined these countries as a place targeted by immigrants. The usual destinations are the big cities (e.g., Madrid and Barcelona) and the Mediterranean coast, including Almeria and El Ejido, where labor-intensive agriculture abounds. The cheap, often illegal, and exploited labor, particularly of Moroccan nationals, is at the heart of the economic miracle of El Ejido.

Both the foreign and racial origin of this population, along with their - sometimes - illegal status in Spain, are also at the heart of the racist atmosphere in El Ejido. This atmosphere provoked the shameful events of early February 2000. After the funeral of a young Spanish woman who had been killed by a young man of Moroccan origin, all hell broke loose and the "caza del moro" was declared. Moroccan nationals were beaten up, their plastic huts and shacks were burned down, their businesses (bars, teahouses, butcheries, etc.) looted and wrecked, and their mosques desecrated and destroyed. This rampage compelled most of the immigrants to take refuge in the nearby mountains or in friends' houses that had not been destroyed. Some observers argued that all of this was happening while the police looked the other way. As a result, between

500 and 700 Moroccans lost their homes; n5 49 people were injured; n6 and 158 people were arrested by the police, 92 of whom were immigrants. n7 Furthermore, eight of the Spanish arrestees were arrested as suspects of the beating of a regional politician, rather than the mayhem that enveloped the Maghrebis.

These events triggered my writing of this Article. El Poniente is an area where I have lived a large part of my life; an area that I love; an area that hurts. What could possibly have made the inhabitants of [*895] El Ejido do this? What were the living conditions of the Moroccan immigrants before and after these shameful events? Can these conditions and riots be traced to the immigration policies of Spain and the rest of the European countries, which are now a combined territory without internal borders? These are the questions that I will try to answer in this Article. I am more interested in the situations that led to the riots, rather than the riots themselves. Therefore, I will only deal with what are usually called the background causes of the riots. I believe that the immediate cause of the riots - the murder of a young Spanish woman by a Moroccan national - would have never triggered such a violent reaction if the background factors had not prepared the inhabitants of El Ejido to make violence the only possible and legitimate option in their eyes. Thus, the Article will deal with the macro and structural issues that have transformed Spain from a source of emigration to a target of immigration, with one of the toughest anti-immigration laws in Europe. This Article also deals with how these issues and policies have affected the lives of Maghrebis in El Ejido.

Before I turn to laying out these issues, two words of caution are in order. First, my focus on the immigrant problem in Southern Spain does not mean that this is the only racial or ethnic problem in Spain. For example, there has been recurrent and systematic racial discrimination against a gypsy minority that has resided in Spain for centuries. n8 The levels of hate and fear that this minority instills in the rest of the Spanish population is still higher than those produced by any other ethnic group, even Arabs and Africans. n9 There is also a nationalist outcry for autonomy and/or separation by regions such as Catalonia and the Basque Country. In these areas, political parties stress that ethnic differences are a paramount concern. However, this Article is devoted solely to the Moroccan immigrants in El Ejido. Furthermore, my focus on the experience of Moroccan agricultural laborers in Southern Spain does not mean that there are not other types of immigrants. For example, there are a large number of Moroccan students in Spanish universities, a large number of Black Africans, n10 as well as an increasing number of recent immigrants [*896] from

Eastern-European countries working in Southern Spain. n11 However, the most pressing problems in El Ejido have to do with Moroccan agricultural laborers, and thus my attention will be focused on these persons.

Second, for reasons of time and space, I only deal with the issue of immigration from the side of the target country - Spain. That is, I do not deal with the economic, demographic, or cultural factors that influence people in countries such as Morocco to come to Spain to work. These factors are as important as the ones I will deal with in this Article, if we are to understand fully the phenomenon of immigration. However, my goal is a little more humble than offering a comprehensive explanation of immigration to Spain, and thus I focus only on the conditions that immigrants encounter once they arrive in Southern Spain.

II. Recent Changes and Immigration Policies in Europe and Spain

One cannot understand the riots in El Ejido, or the events and contexts that led to them, without taking a closer look at the big picture. Specifically, the economic, cultural, and structural changes in Europe during the last twenty years are relevant, as well as the ties Spain now shares with the rest of Europe after forty years of Francoist autarchy. These changes and relationships both taint the general context within which Moroccan immigrants decide to come to Spain and influence the ways in which Moroccans live in El Ejido.

Spain has experienced an economic boom that started in the 1960's with the economic reforms of the Francoist regime and culminated in the late 1990's. In the last four years, for example, Spain created as many jobs as the rest of the European Union together. n12 Furthermore, Spain has met the requirements to unite currencies with other economically stable European countries and in January 2002 substituted the Peseta with the Euro.

However, this economic boom has not been achieved without problems and contradictions. First, the unemployment rate in Spain, especially in Andalucia, is still very high. n13 Second, the different [*897] areas of Spain have grown at unequal rates. Southern Spain, especially Andalucia, is still one of the poorest regions in Europe. Third, certain sectors of the population have benefited from this boom, while working class Spaniards and immigrants in labor intensive jobs have suffered. As a result, the boom has placed the working class in low paying and unstable jobs. Within Andalucia, El Ejido embodies the contradictions of this unequal economic growth that has been achieved in such short time: thriving banks

share a space with plastic shacks built by illegal immigrants.

A. Spain: From Old to New World

This economic boom and the unparalleled need for a foreign labor force attracted a host of immigrants from other countries. However, this influx of immigrants is not nearly as high as it is for other European countries. The foreign population represents 8.2% of the total population in France, 7.2% in Germany, and 10% in Belgium, but only 1.6% in Spain - about 654,000 people in a country of nearly 40 million.¹⁴ That is, the influx of immigrants in Spain, which started in 1985,¹⁵ is still very low if we compare it with the immigration rates in other European countries.

However small the numbers of immigrants in Spain, they have changed the population flow in and out of Spain, and the way in which Spaniards view foreigners. During the 1950's, 1960's, and early 1970's, Spanish nationals departed for foreign countries due to the economic hardship and political persecution experienced by many Spaniards after the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) and throughout the autarchic regime imposed by Franco. Latin America, France, Belgium, and Germany were the usual targets of Spanish emigration. In these European countries, Spaniards were discriminated against and understood to exhibit the stereotypical traits of Mediterranean populations: "sloth, corruption, violence and cultural backwardness."¹⁶

With the economic changes of the sixties and seventies, and the political transition to democracy after 1975, Spain opened its doors to **[*898]** Europe and large numbers of foreigners who visited the country's beaches.¹⁷ By the 1970's, the foreigner was experienced as a tourist.¹⁸ As a result, Spaniards sought to establish close relationships with these European travelers.¹⁹ In the 1980's, with larger numbers of Third World immigrants coming to Spain to work,²⁰ the concept of foreigners diversified into two conflicting categories. On the one hand, there are still tourists; these are travelers who are usually well off, light-skinned, and from the North. Spaniards often call this type of foreigner a "guiri". On the other hand, there are immigrant workers who are believed to take jobs away from Spaniards.²¹ They are usually poor, dark-skinned, and from the South, possibly Africa or South America. If they are of Maghrebi origin, they are referred to as "moros". In contrast to the guiri, these foreigners are perceived as different and as a cause of trouble, perturbation, and disorder.²²

This latter foreigner is an immigrant, an economic immigrant, who needs to be restrained and controlled if

Spain is to maintain a certain order and if jobs are not to be taken away from Spaniards. At the core of this perception is an ideology of Spanish culture and concern for its integrity. For Spaniards, it is important to preserve their culture from those foreigners who are not traveling to Spain to enjoy the country's cultural traits and folklore. Given their desire to remain permanently in Spain, economic immigrants are perceived as a threat because their presence may change the character of Spanish life. At this point, these foreigners became viewed as marginal and criminals. In many cases, relationships with them were almost severed.²³ The proclamation of the 1995 "Foreigners Law," Ley Organica 7/1985, which restricts the entrance of foreigners, especially those from Third World countries, is both the embodiment and the proximate cause of this fear and mistrust.

This dichotomous view of the foreigners is crucial to understand the immigrants' situation in El Ejido. According to the 1991 Census, El Ejido is a town of 41,700 inhabitants that belongs to an area in Almeria called "El Poniente" (the western part of the coast of Almeria). This area has been known not only for its agriculture and fishing, but also for its tourism. Since the seventies, Germans, Danish, Japanese, and Spanish tourists have visited the beaches of the area including Roquetas, Aguadulce, Adra, or Almerimar. No real **[*899]** problems with these visitors have been reported: they are "guiris," or tourists who come to Spain to spend money, rather than to make it.

However, the situation of the Maghrebi visitors is quite different. They are not "guiris," but are immigrants, and "moros" at that. While Maghrebis usually live in shacks, tourists rent comfortable apartments with ocean views. "Moros" wake up early in the morning to go to work, while "guiris" sleep in and lounge on the beach. While Maghrebis go to sleep early, the tourists stay out late spending money in the local stores, restaurants, and clubs, which often prohibit "los moros" from even entering.

In sum, Spain shifted from being an old world country of emigration to a country of immigration - a new world country.²⁴ This shift has not occurred without contradictions or problems. Immigration, albeit necessary, is not welcome. According to a recent United Nations report, Spain needs roughly 240,000 immigrants a year to maintain its current living standards and to keep its pension system going.²⁵ Furthermore, over the past two years Spain's population has grown largely because of births within immigrant populations.²⁶ How can we explain these contradictions - namely, the fact that Spain's immigrants are feared and hated even though they are essential to the economic success and growth of this

country? Hate, racial prejudice, and discrimination - such as those that arose violently in El Ejido - are at the heart of this issue. But this racial discrimination has to be put within the context of the new European Union without internal barriers that Spain joined in January 1986.

B. Spain: The Gendarme of the European Union

A united Europe is only a creation of the present; Europe has never been organized as a single unit. Throughout most of history, European countries pulled their own weight, built different colonial empires, and even fought against one another. After the Second World War, however, these countries rediscovered and got closer to one another. n27 The old and cherished ideal of a common European culture was renewed and reconstructed as though it emerged directly from Greece, Rome, and Christianity. Besides not taking into account [*900] different regional cultures, equating European culture with high culture, ignoring popular culture altogether, and obviating the present multiethnic realities of European countries, this definition of European culture creates a kind of Europe that is chauvinistic, alienating, and racist for a large number of people. n28 It produces a type of Europe in which, as internal boundaries disappear, external boundaries become more important and sturdy. n29 After January 1, 1993, there are no customs or national boundaries among the countries within the Schengen Space. As a consequence, capital, services, and people - well, certain people, namely European nationals - can go from one country to another without a passport or passing through customs.

In this Europe, the old ethnocentric racism - the nationals of each country used to hate people from every other country - is substituted by a modern Eurocentric racism, under which European citizens differentiate themselves from non-European nationals. n30 Specifically, a Europe of liberty, reason, enlightenment, and modernity defines itself in opposition of an Asia and Africa - an Islamic World - of oppression, premodernity, and despotism. "Europe's historic frontier ... with the world of Islam is being reactivated" with this sort of differentiation in mind. n31

The inherent racism in the Union's definition of Europe is embodied in the institutions that deal with the "problem" of immigration: the Third Pillar n32 and the Schengen Accord. n33 Neither of these institutions are under democratic control by the European Parliament, but rather are police-like institutions that have equated police issues of security with immigration and are only accountable to the Council of Ministers of Justice and Home Affairs. n34 Furthermore, in Spain, the

responsibility for dealing with immigration shifted from the Ministry of Labor to that of Home [*901] Affairs - the office that also controls the police. That is, the police deal with all of the issues regarding citizenship and nationality. In sum, the equation of crime and immigration that is so familiar in all parts of the world is built into the institutions that deal with immigration in the new and united Europe. n35 This equation "now forms a basis for the new European state." n36 With this in mind, the control of immigrants from outside Europe, as well as those who are already inside, becomes an issue of European security in light of disappearing internal national borders.

This is the type of Europe that Spain joined in 1986 and now helps to create. In fact, it can be argued that for Spain to become a member of the European Community it had to pass a law that would control and regulate the entrance of foreigners n37 due to the worries of northern and central European countries about uncontrolled immigration. n38 Accordingly, in the summer of 1985, the Spanish government and congress passed the Ley de Extranjeria, or "Foreigners Law," which is the toughest immigration law in Europe. n39 This law, which was revised in February 2000 and strengthened in December 2000, n40 is based on several tenets. First, the key idea is that people's origins make them inherently different and unequal. Illegal immigrants, for example, do not have the right to a fair trial to review their case. Second, immigrants are a source of cheap labor that can be used and then thrown away. In fact, immigrants will only be given permission to stay in the country as long as the job that they arrived to perform exists. Once the work is done, the immigrant has to return to his country of origin immediately. Third, Europe is an island of fortune and should remain an island with closed frontiers. Most important is that Spain should create a barricade to protect [*902] "Fortress Europe." n41

In sum, Spain has also adopted the idea of a united Europe based on Eurocentric racism that is directed particularly against Islam. As Driessen puts it, "the 'Moor' is an exemplar of what Spaniards are not, an inferior alien, yet he is also close and familiar, part of the cultural heritage." n42 This means that Spaniards have had to both cope with and reject their own Arabic roots. n43 In this regard, Spaniards have severed their ties to Africa and dissolved their differences with the rest of Europe. Spain has become the gendarme of the European Union, for it controls and restrains access to its neighbors in the Maghreb. Spain is now the tall barrier that a united Europe believes is necessary. The Mediterranean has become the ditch in which large numbers of Maghrebis die on their trek to Europe for a better life. In 2000, 47 people were missing, 55 died,

and 14,893 were captured. n44 We can now say that, contrary to the traditional bromide, the new Europe starts at the Gibraltar Strait rather than the Pyrenees.

III. The Living Conditions of Maghrebis in El Ejido

In this context, it is not difficult to understand that the living conditions of Maghrebis in Southern Spain are quite dismal. According to a report by Almeria Acoge, n45 the Workers' Committees ("CCOO"), and Workers' General Union ("UGT"), n46 in 1998 there were 5,540 economic immigrants in El Ejido - most of them Moroccans. n47 If this figure is accurate, we can easily see that the percentage of foreigners in El Ejido, namely 9.57%, is much higher than in the rest [*903] of Spain or other European countries. n48 One may think that this influx, in itself, contributes to the high incidence of racial animosity, for the foreign population is obviously very visible. However, we have to put these figures in perspective: only 25% (1,385) of these Moroccans actually live in town. This means that in the town of El Ejido, the percentage of Moroccan inhabitants is somewhere between 2% and 3.3%, depending on the figures we use. The other 75% of Moroccans (4,155) are disseminated among the thousands of acres of greenhouses in shacks, plastic huts, garages, and storage houses that their employers rent to them. These "homes" are usually in very bad condition, with bunks and mattresses piled up side by side. Fifty-five percent of these "homes" lack running water, 57% lack a bathroom, 56% lack a kitchen, and 31% lack electricity. n49 In general, about 60% of the Moroccan immigrants in El Ejido live in sub-par housing (infraviviendas). n50 Some of these "homes" were used as agricultural warehouses by Spanish farmers in the 1960's and 1970's, but were later abandoned for better locations downtown. n51

The housing picture underscores the poor living conditions of Moroccans in El Ejido. However, there is a factor that cannot be overstressed: Moroccans live away from the rest of the population thanks to a series of "coincidences" perpetuated by the local government. The result is a system of apartheid whereby the immigrants are systematically pushed away from the center of town. First, the owners of the greenhouses who hire illegal immigrants prefer to lodge them outside of people's view. Second, the owners of available apartments are afraid to rent them to immigrants because they regard the immigrants as dirty and dangerous. Third, the programs that the regional government has implemented have failed to solve El Ejido's discriminatory housing market. To reduce fears of renting to immigrants, these programs have provided landlords with free insurance. However,

the local government has systematically discounted these initiatives. n52

This apartheid is compounded by the fact that immigrants are dispersed among the greenhouses. As Douglass Massey and Nancy [*904] Denton argue, ethnic segregation is the most important factor that disadvantages African Americans in the United States. n53 In El Ejido, the disadvantages associated with segregation are amplified by the lack of contact between the immigrants themselves that precludes solidarity and mutual support. Furthermore, El Ejido's "disseminated ghetto" (gueto diseminado), as Sanchez Miranda calls it, produces high levels of ethnic conflict in the area. n54 On the one hand, the segregation of the Maghrebis in El Ejido produces fear and mistrust among the Spanish population. This fear is boosted by a propaganda campaign produced by the local media and politicians that, contrary to data suggesting the opposite, portrays immigrants as responsible for the rising crime rates. n55

My personal experience in El Poniente tells me that this campaign has worked as intended. Crime is one of the most important concerns that locals have when talking about immigration. Furthermore, the majority of the contacts between the locals and immigrants are made in the context of the work place, that is, in the greenhouse. In such a context, migrant workers deal with native entrepreneurs who pay them low wages for long hours in tough conditions of heat and humidity. This exploitation of illegal immigrants is rampant. Under these oppressive conditions, the Moroccan worker sometimes reacts bitterly. This situation contributes to the stereotype that Moroccan workers are difficult and prone to controversy. n56 On the other hand, the Maghrebis see racism as the reason for this situation. n57 Consequently, contact between the two communities is scarce and negative. Therefore, the ethnic divide between the two communities becomes larger and more difficult to surmount. n58

This separation became even worse in the aftermath of the February 2000 riots. After several days of intense negotiations between government agencies and various Moroccan workers associations, the Spanish and regional governments, with the help of the Red Cross, decided to install a refugee camp immediately outside [*905] El Ejido. In this camp, all of the Moroccans who had lost their houses in the riots would be given food and shelter. Nevertheless, the local government denied the camp's permit arguing that the camp would create an immigrant ghetto that would only make matters worse. n59 We could argue that the local government was aware that a disseminated immigrant population was less visible and easier to control than one living in a traditional ghetto.

The local government's solution to the problem of housing for immigrants who had lost their homes was to install pre-fabricated barracks among the greenhouses, so the immigrants would not need transportation to get to their job. In short, immigrants should, and would, live by their workplaces. n60 The government's plans included a shuttle bus that, if needed, would take the immigrants from their barracks to a hospital and mall, which are located outside of town. n61 This situation, if not bleak enough, becomes even more unjust when we understand that the labor these people have brought to this area has been instrumental in the economic development of El Ejido. This condition resembles the asymmetrical interdependence relationship between Blacks and Whites that van der Verghe refers to when he describes South African apartheid. n62 If the living conditions of Moroccan immigrants were very poor before the riots, after, they became even worse; the segregation that they suffered previously had become official. Now, even the central government is participating in restricting these immigrants to the huge extension of land covered by plastic.

The bottom line is that Maghrebi immigrants do not belong in El Ejido. Almost 3,000 Moroccan workers "finally got the picture" and abandoned the town after having lost their jobs subsequent to the riots. n63 They were substituted by workers coming from Ecuador and Eastern European countries who were offered better working conditions and housing. n64 Some of these new immigrants speak Spanish and others are white - these characteristics might make them more desirable foreign workers.

[*906]

IV. Conclusion

Throughout the Article, I have argued that the lives of Moroccan immigrants in El Ejido cannot be properly understood without looking at the macro changes that have occurred in both Spain and Europe during the last twenty years. The most important of these changes is that Europe has reunited and differentiated itself from the irrationality, oppression, and difference represented by Africa, Asia, and the Islamic region. Eurocentric racism is the foundation of the tall and thick walls used to separate Europe from the Maghreb. After 1985, Spain started to participate in this conceptualization of Europe and began to despise its own Arab roots. Indeed, Spain actually became the gendarme of Europe by stopping the entrance of foreigners - especially Maghrebis, into its territory, and thus into Europe.

This macro situation establishes the context for thousands of Maghrebi immigrants in southern Spain.

Moroccan immigrants in El Ejido live in a sort of apartheid that is designed in part by the local government. Within this context, it is sad, but hardly surprising that the inhabitants of El Ejido found an excuse to get rid of the immigrants they fear and hate, when one of them killed a woman of Spanish descent. The subsequent riots helped very little in closing the cultural and physical gap that separates both communities. In fact, after the riots, the apartheid present in El Ejido, namely the disseminated ghetto, was also sanctioned by the regional and central governments. This constant situation of racism has contributed to the ethnic substitution of Maghrebis by Ecuadorian and Eastern European workers, who are considered more desirable immigrants.

As Michael Ignatieff notes in *The Road to Nowhere* (1993), a documentary about the Croatian-Serbian war, for different people to live together, they must have "a story they can agree on. They have to have a past they can share, however painful." n65 As long as Europe and Spain define themselves in opposition to Islam, as long as Spaniards do not face their past and sincerely apologize for their history of racial oppression, as long as the narratives about the construction of Spain do not proudly include its Arab roots, as long as Spain is defined as built on the proud defeat and expulsion of the Arabs, and as long as part of the celebrations of Spanish identity and history are predicated on this defeat, Maghrebis and Spaniards will not be able to share a history or agree on a common albeit painful story. Thus, a multicultural Spain seems very distant: shameful events such as those experienced in El Ejido will be doomed to happen again. Contemporary Spain, which is increasingly more [*907] ethnically diverse, is being constructed on the very base that fuels these violent ethnic conflicts: that is racism, even if it is now European rather than simply Spanish.

FOOTNOTE-1:

n1. Juan Goytisolo, *España y sus Ejididos: Sin la Llegada Providencial de los Inmigrantes el "Milagro Almeriense" no Habría Sido Posible*, *El País Digital-España*, Mar. 20, 2000, at <http://www.elpais.com/p/d/20000320/espana/ejido.htm>.

n2. Angeles Castaño Madroal, *Una Sociedad Ahogada en un "Mar de Plásticos": Factores Precipitantes de una Persecución Étnica*, Paper Presented at the II Congreso Sobre La Inmigración en España, Madrid, at 12 (Oct. 5-7, 2000), at <http://www.imsersomigracion.upcp.es/otros%20documentos/congreso/datos/CDRom/>

El Ejido/Ponencias/AngelesCastanio.PDF. For purposes of this article, I have converted Madroal's figure of 4,944 pesetas to dollars, using an exchange rate of about 167 pesetas to the dollar.

n3. Mercedes Jabardo Velasco, *Inmigrantes Magrebies en la Agricultura: la Vega Baja del Segura (Orihuela)*, in *Inmigracion Magrebi en España. El Retorno de los Moriscos 267-89* (Bernabe Lopez Garcia ed., 1993).

n4. "Moro" is Spanish for Moor and is normally used as a derogatory term for people of Arabic origin.

n5. S. Fuertes & M. Gonzalez, *Enciso Acepta el Reallojo de los Inmigrantes en Barracones Junto a Invernaderos*, *El Pais Digital-España*, Feb. 18, 2000, at <http://www.elpais.es/p/d/20000218/espana/almeria.htm>.

n6. Tereixa Constenla, "No Se Como Estoy Hablando Aqui y no Estoy Muerto," *El Pais Digital-España*, Feb. 8, 2000, at <http://www.elpais.es/p/d/temas/ejido/02ejido08.htm>.

n7. Personal Communication with Angeles Garzon Morales, (May 5, 2000). Ms. Garzon Morales is one of the lawyers who helped the immigrants in El Ejido to shape and formalize their complaints to the police.

n8. Patricia Barbadillo Griñan, *Extranjeria, Racismo y Xenofobia en la España Contemporanea: La Evolucion de los Setenta a los Noventa*, 154 *Centro de Investigaciones Sociologicas* 167, 171-72 (1997) (discussing the pervasive perception of gypsies as foreigners ("no españoles") and their exclusion from Spanish society).

n9. *Id.* at 180.

n10. See generally Inongo-vi-Makome, *España y los Negros Africanos: ¿La Conquista del Eden o del Infierno?* (La Llar del Llibre 1990) (analyzing the causes and consequences of African immigration to Spain).

n11. One only needs to walk around El Ejido, Roquetas, or Almerimar to hear

more and more people speaking Romanian, for example. After all, as a hotel manager in Almeriar, tells me, Romanians are considered good workers because they are generally polite and have a good command of Spanish. Personal Communication with Luis Gradia Ruiz (Nov., 2002).

n12. Suzanne Daley, *Spain Turns Cool to the Chief who Engineered its Boom*, *N.Y. Times*, Mar. 12, 2000, at 12.

n13. According to the "Active Population Survey" ("EPA"), carried out by the Spanish National Statistic Institute ("INE"), the national unemployment rate of the third trimester of 2002 is 11.41% and the regional unemployment rate of Andalucía is 20.57%. Furthermore, the unemployment rate of Almeria (the province in which El Ejido is located) was 33.05% at the time of the riots. Banco de Datos Tempus, Instituto Nacional de Estadística, available at <http://www.ine.es/tempus/cgi-bin/ite> (last visited Nov. 12, 2002) (on file with the Rutgers Law Review).

n14. Barbadillo Griñan, *supra* note 8, at 180. According to the 2001 Census, the population in Spain is 40,847,371 people. Banco de Datos Tempus, Instituto Nacional de Estadística, available at <http://www.ine.es/censo2001/pobcen01tab1.xls> (last visited Nov. 14, 2002) (on file with Rutgers Law Review).

n15. Jabardo Velasco, *supra* note 3, at 267-68.

n16. Mathew Carr, *Spain: Racism at the Frontier*, 32 *Race & Class*, Jan.-Mar. 1991, at 93-97. Curiously, these are the same stereotypes that Spaniards now use against the Maghrebis.

n17. *Id.* at 172.

n18. Barbadillo Griñan, *supra* note 8, at 174.

n19. *Id.* at 170.

n20. Jabardo Velasco, *supra* note 3.

n21. Barbadillo Griñan, *supra* note 8, at 171-72.

n22. *Id.* at 179.

n23. Jabardo Velasco, *supra* note 3, at 282.

- n24. Jan Nederveen Pieterse, Fictions of Europe, 32 *Race & Class*, Jan.-Mar. 1991, at 3, 5. Barbadillo Griñan, however, argues that Spain is still a country of emigration, for there are still more than a million Spanish emigrants all over the world. Barbadillo Griñan, *supra* note 8, at 180.
- n25. Goytisolo, *supra* note 1.
- n26. España Alcanza ya los 40 Millones de Habitantes Gracias a la Inmigración, *El País.es*, Dec. 13, 2000, at <http://www.elpais.es/articulo.html?xref=20001213eepisoc&type=Tes&anchor=elpep>.
- n27. Pieterse, *supra* note 24, at 9.
- n28. *Id.* at 3-4.
- n29. *Id.* at 5.
- n30. See Frances Webber, From Ethnocentrism to Euro-Racism, 32 *Race & Class*, Jan.-Mar. 1991, at 11, 11.
- n31. Pieterse, *supra* note 24, at 6.
- n32. See Monica den Boer, Justice and Home Affairs Cooperation in the European Union: Current Issues, European Institute of Public Administration (1996), at <http://eipanel.com/public/publicscope/96/1/3.htm> (last visited Aug. 26, 2002). After the approval of the Treaty on European Union in 1993, "the Third Pillar" substituted the Trevi working groups, which dealt with terrorism, radicalism, extremism, and violence, and the Ad Hoc Group, which was formed to end the abuse of political asylum. *Id.*
- n33. See Tony Bunyan, Towards an Authoritarian European State, 32 *Race & Class*, Jan.-Mar. 1991, at 19-27. These institutions continued to regulate the new united European space that is free of internal barriers. *Id.*
- n34. den Boer, *supra* note 32.
- n35. See Ramiro Martinez, Jr. & Mathew T. Lee, On Immigration and Crime, in 1 *Criminal Justice 2000: The nature of Crime: Continuity and Change* 485 (Gary LaFree et. al. eds., 2000), at <http://www.nejrs.org/criminaljustice2000/vol-1/02j.pdf>. (discussing the equation of crime and immigration in the United States).
- n36. Bunyan, *supra* note 33, at 20.
- n37. Bernabe Lopez Garcia et al., *Implantación e Integración de los Inmigrantes Magrebies en España in Inmigración Magrebi en España: El Retorno de los Moriscos* 55 (Bernabe Lopez Garcia ed., 1993).
- n38. See Webber, *supra* note 30, at 16.
- n39. Carr, *supra* note 16, at 96.
- n40. The Ley de los Derechos y Libertades de los Extranjeros en España y Su Integración Social (Law of Rights and Liberties of Foreigners in Spain, and Their Social Integration), which reforms and strengthens past regulations dealing with foreigners and immigrants, was passed by the Spanish Congress and made active on December 23, 2000. For a comparison between the two versions of this law, see Asesoria, Su Pagina de Derecho Practico. Ley Organica de los Derechos y Libertades de los Extranjeros en España y Su Integración Social, available at <http://club.idecnet.com/manuria/derecho/ple/prole.htm> (last visited Nov. 14, 2002).
- n41. Asociación Por Derechos Humanos de Andalucía, *Derechos Humanos y Ley de Extranjería*, at <http://reicaz.es/extranjeria/revista/002/02-uscore>3.htm> (last visited Mar. 14, 2000).
- n42. Henk Driessen, *On the Spanish-Moroccan Frontier: A Study of Ritual, Power, and Ethnicity* at ix (1992).
- n43. Lopez Garcia, *supra* note 37, at 14; see also HEGOA, Instituto de Estudios Sobre el Desarrollo y la Economía Internacional del País Vasco, *Sistema Educativo y Educación Intercultural*, in *SOS Racismo. Informe Anual sobre el Estado del racismo en el Estado Español* 91-98 (1997).
- n44. *La Entrada Clandestina*, *El País Digital-Temas*, at <http://www.elpais.es/temas/inmigracion/menue/5.html> (last visited Oct. 17, 2002).
- n45. Almería Acoge is the local branch of a prestigious non-governmental organization that has been working for the

integration of immigrants for several years. Its offices were looted and burned down in the riots of February 2000, simply because this organization was accused of helping immigrants legalize their situation in Spain. Goytisoló, *supra* note 1.

n46. The CCOO and UGT are the two biggest labor unions in Spain.

n47. Miguel Gonzalez, *Mas de la Mitad de los Marroquies de el Ejido Viven Hacinados en Infraviviendas*, *El Pais Digital-España*, Feb. 8, 2000, at <http://www.elpais.es/p/d/temas/ejido/02ejido08.htm>.

n48. The local census would say this percentage of the population is even lower, namely 8.6%. Castañero Madroal, *supra* note 2, at 5.

n49. Juan Sanchez Miranda, *Situación de las Viviendas Ocupadas por Inmigrantes en los Municipios de El Ejido, La Mojónera, Berja y Vicar*, Paper Presented at the II Congreso sobre la Inmigración en España, Madrid 11-13 (Oct. 5-7, 2000), at <http://www.imseromigracion.upco.es/otros%20documentos/congreso/datos/CDRom/El%20Ejido/Comunicaciones/JuanSanchezMiranda.PDF>.

n50. *Id.* at 3.

n51. See *id.* at 17-18.

n52. Miguel Gonzalez, *Un Catedrático ya Acuso al Gobierno Local de "Segregar" a los Inmigrantes en 1995*, *El Pais Digital-España*, Feb. 11, 2000, at <http://www.elpais.es/p/d/temas/ejido/2alm114.htm>.

n53. See Douglas S. Massey & Nancy A. Denton, *American Apartheid: Segregation and the Making of the Underclass* 2 (1993).

n54. Sanchez Miranda, *supra* note 49, at 17.

n55. Castañero Madroal, *supra* note 2, at 13.

n56. *Id.*

n57. Sanchez Miranda, *supra* note 49, at 18-19.

n58. Marisol Navas et al., *Una Aproximación Psicosocial a la Inmigración en un Municipio del Poniente Almeriense: Causas, Consecuencias y Políticas Futuras*, Paper Presented at the II Congreso sobre la Inmigración en España, Madrid, (Oct. 5-7, 2000), at <http://www.imseromigracion.upco.es/otros%20documentos/congreso/datos/cdrom/el%20ejido/comunicaciones/marisolnavasicoadrado.PDF>.

n59. Manuel Ariza Jariol, *Modulos Habitacionales: Una Medida de Alojamiento en un Contexto de Crisis*, Paper Presented at the II Congreso sobre la Inmigración en España, Madrid 13-14 (Oct. 5-7, 2000), at <http://www.imseromigracion.upco.es/otros%20documentos/congreso/datos/CDRom/El%20Ejido/Comunicaciones/ManuelAriza.PDF>.

n60. *Id.* at 19.

n61. S. Fuentes & M. Gonzalez, *supra* note 5.

n62. See Pierre L. van den Berghe, *Race and Ethnicity: Essays in Comparative Sociology* 180 (1970).

n63. Castañero Madroal, *supra* note 2, at 18.

n64. *Id.* at 12-13.

n65. Documentary: *A Road to Nowhere* (Michael Ignatieff 1993).

